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3.9 OBSERVATIONS ABOUT THE USE OF CONCEPT MAPPING AS AN ANALYTICAL TOOL

Maps can contain large numbers of concepts if mapping is done in a comprehensive way. Despite this being done during the research activities underlying this book. It is rarely necessary to build highly detailed maps. The approach described in this book has been chosen to reveal the true nature of those problems being addressed. Mostly we need to build maps containing relatively few concepts, but those maps must be highly incisive.

When using any from of causality-directed graph, selecting the appropriate level of aggregation is important. This is a matter of skill and experience. Coyle (1996) and Coyle and Exelby (2000) describe a ‘Cone of Influence Diagrams’ within which diagrams drawn at higher or levels of aggregation fit. The idea of reducing the level of complexity being described to a point where clarification becomes possible is an overall purpose in diagramming (Craig, 2000).

Table 3-1. Major Risk Key Performance Indicators—Black Hawk Case

Risk-management issue / key performance indicator

Actual consequences / comments

Serviceability of aircraft

Shortage of serviceable aircraft in 1994 and 1995 (Concept 28, Figure 2-5) contributed to:

  • Reduced opportunity for pilots to gain experience in CT/SRO operations.
  • Declining morale among pilots and QFIs.
  • 5 Avn Regt exercising with insufficient intensity and at too low a level.

Pilot / QFI availability and current level of competence

Declining morale (Concept 22, Figures 2-5 and 2-6) contributed to:

  • High separation rates among pilots and QFIs.
  • Shortage of trained crews.
  • Overloading of individual aircrew.
  • Subsequent loss of experience base.

Occurrence of technical control ‘incidents’

Technical control of aviation matters within Army being under-resourced (Concept 29, Figures 2-5 and 2-6) contributed to:

  • Shortage of serviceable aircraft in 1994 and 1995.
  • 5 Avn Regt exercising with insufficient intensity and at too low a level.
  • Failure to inform judgement of those responsible for designing combined arms training and associated safety [and support].

Frequency of aircraft incidents in training

Insensitivity to reported aircraft incidents led to failures in design of training (Concept 4, Figures 2-5 and 2-6), which contributed to:

  • Inadequate oversight and control of combined arms activity (CT/SRO training exercise).
  • Failure to put fail-safe procedures in place.
  • Failure to recognise importance of training incidents involving aircraft.

Oversight and control of combined arms CT/SRO training

Inadequate oversight and control of CT/SRO combined arms training activities (Concept 14, Figures 2-5 and 2- 6), which contributed to:

  • Failure to recognise complexity of tasks 5 Avn Regt were required to undertake to support CT/SRO and capability development.
  • Discrepancies in Command and Control.

Clarification follows recognition and recognition is context-dependent. To ensure we create enhanced opportunities for executive decision-makers to recognise patterns of behaviour we have to create the right context (Richardson and Pugh, 1981; Carroll and Johnson, 1990; Klein et al., 1993; Klein, 1998; Gigerenzer, et al., 1999). Consequently, we initially focus attention on setting and developing the context. Facilitating ‘situation awareness’ (Klein, 1998) is critically dependent on recognition. It is also an essential precursor to understanding, understanding which must be developed before we can develop workable management strategies. The main threat to any mapping activity is in failure to be objective. This failure could result in the building of maps representing what the person building the map hoped the author or interviewee might be saying rather than what that person actually said or wrote. The mapper cannot let his own views or biases to be built into the maps. One technique for minimising bias is to present the complete, or partially complete, map back to the author for validation. This is consistent with an action research/action learning approach (Revans, 1982; Perry and Zuber-Skerrit, 1991). The knowledge-elicitation technique used during empirical case study research upon which this book is based involved a two-staged interview process:

When mapping, particular attention must be paid to:

References

  • Coyle, R.G., 1996, System Dynamics Modelling: A Practical Approach, Chapman and Hall, London.
  • Craig, M., 2000, Thinking Visually: Business Applications of Fourteen Core Diagrams, Continuum, London.
  • Richardson, G.P. and Pugh, A.L.III., 1981, Introduction to system dynamics modelling, MIT Press/Wright-Allen, Portland, Oregon.
  • Carroll, J. S. and Johnson, E. J., 1990, Decision Research: A Field Guide, Sage Publications, Newbury Park, California.
  • Klein, G., Orasanu, J., Calderwood, R. and Zsambok, C. (eds.), 1993, “Decision Making in Action: Models and Methods”, Ablex, Norwood, New Jersey.
  • Klein, G., 1998, Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions, MIT Press.
  • Gigerenzer, G., Todd, P., and ABC Research Group, 1999, Simple Heuristics that Make Us Smart, Oxford University Press.
  • Revans, R.W., 1982, The origins and development of action learning, Brookfield Publishing, England.
  • Perry, C. and Zuber-Skerritt, O., 1991 ‘Action Research in Graduate Management Programs, ’ in: Proc. The First World Congress on Action Research and Process Management, Acorn Publications, Sunnybank Hills, Queensland.
  • Kelly, G.A., 1955, The psychology of personal constructs: A theory of personality, Norton, New York.