Decision Making: Risk Management, Systems Thinking and Situation Awareness
Risk Management, Systems Thinking and Situation Awareness
Contents
- Foreword
- Preface
- 1 MANAGERIAL COGNITION AND CAUSALITY
- 1.1 A PARADOX AND A POLAR BEAR
- 1.2 STAKEHOLDER INVOLVEMENT IN RISK MANAGEMENT
- 1.3 NEED TO UNDERSTAND MANAGERIAL COGNITION FIRST
- 1.4 MAPPING WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT THE PROBLEM AT HAND
- 1.5 KNOWLEDGE ELICITATION BASED ON MANAGERIAL COGNITION
- 1.5.1 Human Decision Making—Bounded Rationality And Heuristics In Quick Decisions
- 1.5.2 ‘Gut Feeling’ In Human Decision Making
- 1.5.3 Human Decision Making—When We Get It Wrong
- 1.5.4 Cognitive Failure
- 1.5.5 Confusion Over Correlation And Causality
- 1.5.6 Desire To Keep It Simple
- 1.5.7 Human Decision Making—Belief And Learning
- 1.5.8 Dynamic Environments—Misperceptions Of The Implications Of Feedback
- 1.5.9 Human Decision Making—Different Perspectives On The Same Problem
- 1.5.10 Masking The Reasoning Behind Decisions—Ratio Decidendi And Obiter Dictum
- 1.5.11 Systems Of Meaning
- 1.5.12 Summary Of Human Cognitive Limitations
- 1.5.13 Harnessing Human Recognitional Capacity
- 1.6 IMPORTANCE OF COMMUNICATIONS IN DECISION CYCLES
- 1.7 DYNAMIC AND COMPLEX BEYOND OUR INTUITION
- 1.8 DEVELOPING MENTAL AGILITY
- 1.9 SUPERIOR INSIGHTS LEAD TO SUPERIOR LEARNING
- 1.10 BARRIERS TO LEARNING AND EFFECTIVE DECISION MAKING IN DYNAMICALLY COMPLEX ENVIRONMENTS
- 1.11 SYSTEMS OF KNOWLEDGE-POWER
- 1.12 FINDING OUT ABOUT A PROBLEM SITUATION
- 1.13 LEARNING OPPORTUNITIES LOST
- 1.14 SUMMARY
- 2 WORST FAILURE - FAILURE TO LEARN ABOUT RISKS
- 2.1 MORE THAN A SIMPLE ACCIDENT
- 2.2 BLACK HAWK HELICOPTER CRASH—CASE STUDY OVERVIEW
- 2.2.1 Black Hawk Helicopter Crash—Executive Summary
- 2.2.2 Concept Mapping Of Factors Contributing To The Accident
- 2.2.3 Concept Mapping Methodology—By Example
- 2.2.4 Analysis Of Executive Summary—In Brief
- 2.2.5 A Call For Quantification Of Causal Linkages
- 2.2.6 Chief Of Army’s Report To The Minister For Defence
- 2.3 INSIGHTS DERIVED FROM FEEDBACK LOOPS
- 2.4 IDENTIFYING WHERE TO APPLY RISK-MANAGEMENT EFFORT
- 2.5 FOCUS ON CRITICAL NODES
- 2.6 BREAKDOWN IN MANAGEMENT OF RISKS
- 2.7 PITFALLS AND POINTERS OF CONCEPT MAPPING PRACTICE
- 2.8 SUMMARY
- 3 ROYAL CANBERRA HOSPITAL IMPLOSION AND FURTHER INSIGHTS
- 3.1 EVENTS GONE SO HORRIBLY WRONG
- 3.2 IMPLOSION INQUIRY: NO SIMPLE ANSWERS
- 3.3 IDENTIFYING CANDIDATES FOR QUANTITATIVE MODELLING
- 3.4 VALUE OF MAPPING
- 3.5 THE BUSINESS DYNAMICS CONTEXT
- 3.6 REFLECTING ON OUR DESIRE FOR SIMPLE ANSWERS
- 3.7 FAILURE TO LEARN—FAR TOO COMMON
- 3.8 MAJOR RISK KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS
- 3.9 OBSERVATIONS ABOUT THE USE OF CONCEPT MAPPING AS AN ANALYTICAL TOOL
- 3.10 DIFFICULTIES OF AMALGAMATING MAPS
- 3.11 SUMMARY
- 4 COMING TO GRIPS WITH 'WICKED' PROBLEMS IN RISKY SITUATIONS
- 4.1 REFLECTION ON DIFFICULTIES IN MANAGING RISKS
- 4.2 BRIEF REFLECTION ON THE BLACK HAWK HELICOPTER CRASH
- 4.3 AVERSION TO DEALING WITH EXCESSIVELY COMPLEX ISSUES
- 4.4 COGNITIVE DISSONANCE
- 4.5 CULTURAL IMPEDIMENTS—BEING INSENSITIVE TO RISKS
- 4.6 WINNING THE INFORMATION NEEDED TO ENABLE ANALYSIS
- 4.7 STAKEHOLDER MANAGEMENT
- 4.8 WHY COMPLEX PROBLEMS ARE DIFFICULT TO MANAGE
- 4.9 CHARACTERISTICS OF WICKED PROBLEMS AND STRATEGIES FOR ADDRESSING THEM
- 4.9.1 Tame Vs Wicked Problems—Ability To Formulate The Problem
- 4.9.2 Tame Vs. Wicked Problems—Relationship Between Problem And Solution
- 4.9.3 Tame Vs. Wicked Problems—Testability
- 4.9.4 Tame Vs. Wicked Problems—Finality
- 4.9.5 Tame Vs. Wicked Problems—Traceability
- 4.9.6 Tame Vs. Wicked Problems—Explanatory Characteristics
- 4.9.7 Tame Vs. Wicked Problems—Level Of Analysis
- 4.9.8 Tame Vs. Wicked Problems—Reproduceability
- 4.9.9 Tame Vs. Wicked Problems—Replicability
- 4.9.10 Tame Vs. Wicked Problems—Responsibility
- 4.10 SUMMARY
- 5 ADDRESSING WICKED RISK-MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS
- 6 APPLICATION OF IISD: A TUTORIAL FOR REAL-LIFE PROBLEMS
- 6.1 DISAPPOINTINGLY INEFFECTIVE IN MANAGING COMPLEXITY
- 6.2 TUTORIAL—PREVIEW
- 6.3 NATURE OF THE TUTORIAL PROBLEM—BRIEF OVERVIEW
- 6.4 THE DIRECTORS’ QUANDARY
- 6.5 PUTTING THREETWOONE-READY BACK ON TRACK—FIRST STEPS
- 6.6 ACCOMMODATING STAKEHOLDER PERSPECTIVES
- 6.7 WORKING WITH SUBGROUPS TO ELICIT THEIR VIEWS OF THE PROBLEM SITUATION
- 6.8 PRODUCTION AN ‘EXECUTIVE SUMMARY’ CONCEPT MAP
- 6.9 ANALYSIS OF DYNAMIC BEHAVIOUR USING CAUSAL LOOP OR INFLUENCE DIAGRAMMING
- 6.10 IMPLEMENTATION AND MONITORING
- 6.11 PITFALLS AND POINTERS IDENTIFIED DURING ATTEMPTS AT SOLVING THREETWOONE’S PROBLEM
- 6.12 REACTION TO IISD AND SYSTEM DYNAMICS MODELLING
- 6.13 SUMMARY
- 7 TAKING ACTION
- 7.1 ATTITUDES CONSTRAIN AWARENESS
- 7.2 MANAGING COMPLEXITY—BUILDING A MULTI-DIMENSIONAL JIGSAW PUZZLE
- 7.3 STRATEGIES FOR BUILDING THE RISK-MANAGEMENT PUZZLE
- 7.4 HIGHLY DESIRABLE ELEMENTS OF RISK-MANAGEMENT CULTURE
- 7.5 THE RISK-MANAGEMENT PROCESS
- 7.6 NAVIGATING THE RISK-MANAGEMENT PROCESS AND MAKING THE ‘RIGHT’ DECISIONS
- 7.7 VIGILANCE AND CONTINUAL ITERATION
- 7.8 TAKING UP THE CUDGEL
