5.3 THE CENTRALITY OF INFORMATION SUPERIORITY
One of the central claims made in the Network Centric vision is the proposition that networking translates into information superiority. This claim fails on at least two different points: it overestimates man’s capacity to deal with contradictory information and it underestimates the enemy’s ability for mischief. As to the first point, listen to Clausewitz again [8]:
Great part of the information obtained in war is contradictory, a still greater part is false, and by far the greatest part is of doubtful character. Most reports are false, and the timidity of men acts as a multiplier of lies and untruth. As a general rule, every one is most inclined to lend credence to the bad than to the good. Every one is inclined to magnify the bad in some measure, and although the alarms which are thus propagated like the waves of the sea subside into themselves, still, like them, without any apparent cause they rise again. Firm in reliance on his own better convictions, the Chief must stand like a rock against which the sea breaks its fury in vain.
Clearly, no amount of networking of information will change the import of Clausewitz’ observation because he talks about men’s natural reaction to information, not about information itself. Moreover, as the passage quoted above indicates, the whole hinges on the Chief and his ability to steadfastly follow his vision against the frailties of his men. Modern technology will not help the military establishment create any more Chiefs than it has ever been able to create in the past.
Concerning the second point, that Network Centrism underestimates the enemy’s ability for mischief, the proposition that networking translates into information superiority is manifestly true if, and only if, the enemy passively lays himself out to be observed. The proponents of Network Centric Warfare clearly tend to believe the enemy would do exactly that. For them, the enemy is a fixed target endowed with little, if any, initiative, unable to effectively hide himself from the all-seeing eye of the network.
Network Centrism carries the passivity of its assumed enemy to its ultimate conclusion: it telescopes all war down to strike. Listen to this description of war [9]:
First, the target must be detected. Second, it must be identified. Third the decision to engage the target must be made. Fourth, the decision must be conveyed to the weapon. Fifth, the weapon must be aimed and fired.
No allowance is made here for the possibility that the target might not be detectable, or that, while we decide to engage, transmit that decision to the weapon system, aim and fire, the target may react to it being targeted. Network Centrism, therefore, does not see us getting involved into a truly two-sided position warfare full of surprising moves by the enemy, as described in the tales of glory told in books of military history, but rather it envisions us standing off at some safe distance and surgically destroying largely helpless enemy forces at will. This more than anything else, is perhaps at the root of our immediate fascination with Network Centric Warfare.
Unfortunately, strikes can easily be defeated by creatively hiding from the attacker’s eye. Moreover, history has shown that successful strike operations are not automatically followed by successful war outcomes. If Hitler’s war machine would not have disintegrated from within for lack of credible central command, the strategic bombing raids of World War II would not have defeated the Germans [10]; Saddam Hussein was still ruling in Iraq long after repeated strikes were levied at his infrastructure and, as we know, it took “boots on the ground” to remove him from the government of Iraq; the strike operations in Kosovo have done little to destroy the Serb Army, and the Northern Alliance had probably more to do with the collapse of the Taliban than our strike operations did. One should not underestimate the power of an enemy that resorts to deception and evasion.