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Curbing Innovation

How Command Technology Limits Network Centric Warfare

Alfred Kaufman

Western nations stand at a national-security crossroads: they can continue along the familiar path of preparing for peer-state conflict by adapting Cold War systems with modern internet technologies, or they can take the less familiar path of preparing for a new form of war against weaker but determined terrorist adversaries. This book argues that, although the real threat lies along “the road less traveled,” Western nations have wrongly chosen the well-worn route, and it makes a forceful case that choosing the alternative path may, as Robert Frost put it, “make all the difference.”

Contents

  1. Blurb
  2. Foreword
  3. Preface
  4. 1 INTRODUCTION
  5. 2 CONTROLLING MILITARY TECHNOLOGY
    1. 2.1 COMMAND TECHNOLOGY
    2. 2.2 THE PRUSSIAN GENERAL STAFF
    3. 2.3 THE AMERICAN PRACTICE OF SYSTEMS ANALYSIS
  6. 3 THE HEYDAYS OF SYSTEMS ANALYSIS
    1. 3.1 THE COLD WAR PLANNING SCENARIO
    2. 3.2 WHAT IS SYSTEMS ANALYSIS?
    3. 3.3 THE ART OF SYSTEMS ANALYSIS
      1. 3.3.1 What Kind Of Technology To Buy?
      2. 3.3.2 How Many Weapon Systems To Buy?
    4. 3.4 WHAT IS A FAIR PRICE TO PAY FOR A WEAPON SYSTEM?
    5. 3.5 ACQUISITION OF THE WAR MACHINE
  7. 4 THE DECLINE AND FALL OF SYSTEMS ANALYSIS
    1. 4.1 THE COLD WAR SCENARIO CEASES TO BE PREDICTIVE
    2. 4.2 MODELING AND SIMULATION REPLACES SYSTEMS ANALYSIS
    3. 4.3 THE BIRTH OF THE NETWORK CENTRIC DOCTRINE OF WARFARE
      1. 4.3.1 Network Centric Language
      2. 4.3.2 The Network Centric Vision
      3. 4.3.3 The Five Hypotheses Of Network Centric Warfare
      4. 4.3.4 The Conditions That Color The Hypotheses
      5. 4.3.5 The Network Centric Warfare Story Line
    4. 4.4 CONCLUSION
  8. 5 A CRITICAL VIEW OF NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE DOCTRINE
    1. 5.1 THE ECONOMIC PEDIGREE OF NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE
    2. 5.2 NETWORK CENTRISM AS AN IDEOLOGY
    3. 5.3 THE CENTRALITY OF INFORMATION SUPERIORITY
    4. 5.4 RETIRING THE PLATFORM-CENTRIC WAR MACHINE
    5. 5.5 THE SELF-DEFEATING CHARACTER OF NETWORK CENTRISM
  9. 6 THE DESTRUCTIVE CONSEQUENCES OF NETWORK CENTRISM
    1. 6.1 A RELENTLESS DRIVE FOR INNOVATION MAY HURT SECURITY
    2. 6.2 WISHFUL THINKING BECOMES STRATEGY
    3. 6.3 BUREAUCRACY TAKES OVER THE DYNAMICS OF WAR
    4. 6.4 COMMAND AND CONTROL BECOMES A NETWORK OF COMPUTERS
    5. 6.5 MACHINES REPLACE HUMANS
    6. 6.6 OVERWHELMING POWER IGNORES WAR DIPLOMACY
  10. 7 BRINGING COMMAND TECHNOLOGY UNDER CONTROL AGAIN
    1. 7.1 REPLACING SCENARIO WITH A NEW PLANNING PARADIGM
      1. 7.1.1 How To Identify Singular Vulnerabilities
      2. 7.1.2 How To Eliminate Singular Vulnerabilities
    2. 7.2 REINSTATING THE PRIMACY OF SYSTEMS ANALYSIS
  11. 8 THE LIMITS OF NETWORK CENTRISM
    1. 8.1 THE LIMIT IMPOSED BY ENEMY DECEPTION
    2. 8.2 THE LIMITS IMPOSED BY ENEMY EVASION WHILE UNDER ATTACK
    3. 8.3 THE LIMITS IMPOSED BY THE HUMAN CHARACTER
      1. 8.3.1 Limits Imposed By Human Individuality
      2. 8.3.2 The Limits Imposed By Human Proficiency
    4. 8.4 BUYING INDIVIDUAL HUMAN PROFICIENCY
    5. 8.5 THE MAN-MACHINE DEBATE
  12. 9 NETWORK CENTRISM CHASTENED
    1. 9.1 UNDERESTIMATING OUR ENEMY
    2. 9.2 OVERESTIMATING OURSELVES
    3. 9.3 REORIENTING THE ACQUISITION PROCESS
  13. 10 CONCLUSION
  14. A THE RETENTION MODEL
  15. B THE AUTOMATION MODEL

Author

Dr Alfred Kaufman is a study director with the Institute for Defense Analysis in Alexandria, Virginia. He holds a doctoral degree in high energy physics from New York University and has had extensive experience in all facets of defense analysis. Over the years, he participated in many studies concerning both national as well as NATO technology acquisition issues.