Curbing Innovation / 5 / 5.2

5.2 NETWORK CENTRISM AS AN IDEOLOGY

Imagining that it was born of a revolution in economic affairs, Network Centric Warfare thinks of itself as a revolution in military affairs. Needless to say, it is no more a revolution in military affairs than the economic changes above were a revolution in economic affairs. This transcendental tendency of proponents of Network Centric Warfare to jump over reality by overstating their case is typical of movements with a mission. Network Centric Warfare appears therefore to be a new ideology that presents itself in the cloak of a new technology.

Like all other –isms that preceded it, Network Centrism begins by ignoring the true nature of the human character. Although Clausewitz constantly reminds that war is driven by human hostility, the authors of Network Centrism seem to think that information technology and the new weapon systems based on that technology can, all by themselves, fundamentally change that fact. However, Clausewitz’s work depends only marginally on the nature of the weapons used in his own time and rests fundamentally on a study of the character of man. To quote a pertinent passage [5]:

Theory must also take into account the human element; it must accord a place to courage, boldness, even rashness. The Art of War has to deal with living and with moral forces, the consequences of which is that it can never attain to the absolute and positive. Courage and self-reliance are principles quite essential to War; consequently, theory must only set up such rules as allow ample scope for all degrees and varieties of these necessary and noblest of military virtues.

One of the examples Network-Centrists like to recount is Admiral Clemmins’ use of e-mail to “revolutionize” communications in the Straits of Taiwan. One wonders, however, what would have happened to Clemmins’ well-laid plans had a real enemy possessed the rashness, to use Clausewitz’ suggestive word, to interfere with the operation by throwing a virus or two into the network? Let us remember that Soviet communism has ultimately failed, not only because of our containment strategy, but also because human character stubbornly interfered with Lenin’s well-laid plans.

Indeed, the idea, often expressed in the Network Centric literature that we should [6]:

try to achieve information with one hundred percent content and accuracy with zero time delay,

only carries the disregard for reality beyond the specific disregard for human character discussed above. The belief in the absolute perfectibility of things expressed in the previous quotation has the alluring sound of all –isms that populate the grave yard of history; it does violence to reality by subjugating it to an Utopian vision from the vantage point of which all natural limits become mere obstacles to be overcome by diligence, determination, and, if need be, by brute force. Thus, the proponents clearly recognize that current warfighters do not live up to their vision when they say [7]:

The war fighter who does not understand the source of his combat power in such things as Collaborative Engagement Capability, Global Command and Control, and Link-16, simply is worth less than those who do.

But they are unwilling to consider the possibility that not enough humans can sufficiently understand these things to make-up a military force; instead, they continue the thought by saying [7]:

The Services must both mainstream and merge those with technical skills and those with operational experience in these areas. These are the new operators.

Unfortunately, of course, new men cannot be created, they just happen to occur from time to time.

To see what awaits such a disposition for creating new men, compare the Utopian vision of the French Revolution, the grandfather of all subsequent –isms, to the realistic recognition of natural limits by the writers of the American Constitution. The latter have produced a document that comfortably guided a nation of real people towards a prosperous future, while the former required the guillotine to implement its vision of a new man.

The other feature Network Centrism shares with all ideologies is the need it feels to develop a new language. Network Centric speak is everywhere. They speak of competition to describe a bloody war, of competition space to describe the battlefield. They talk of things such as ecosystems, infostructures, self-synchronization, thin clients, logic bombs, and actors, and they dispose of our enemies whenever they intend to kill them. Apparently a new lingo strengthens the impression that we are on the verge of something truly new, something so revolutionary that it requires a creative extension of our current capacity to communicate.