Curbing Innovation / 4 / 4.3 / 4.3.3

4.3.3 The Five Hypotheses Of Network Centric Warfare

The feasibility of this Network Centric Warfare vision rests upon five conditional hypotheses. We use the term conditional hypothesis to convey the fact that the vision obtains from the hypotheses if, and only if, certain conditions are also satisfied. In this section we focus only upon the hypotheses themselves, leaving the job of explaining the conditions involved for the next section.

The first of these hypotheses asserts that the networking of battlefield entities produces shared information between those entities. Clearly, when the entities connected by the network are sensors and the connection between them consists of data links, this assertion is trivially true; what is therefore hypothetical here, is that the same would remain valid even when humans were included in the battlespace entities. In other words, since the hypothesis would not be really hypothetical if one used the Network Centric definition of information given in the previous section, the hypothesis is intended to extend the validity of the assertion to the case when the common meaning of the word information is employed instead. The reason why the assertion becomes hypothetical when humans are involved is that two people need not agree as to the veracity of the information they communicate to each other. Consequently, the information content shared between human entities need not necessarily become shared information. The fact that it does, according to Network Centric Warfare doctrine, is therefore the true content of the first hypothesis.

The second hypothesis asserts that virtual collaboration between networked, battlespace entities transforms shared information into shared knowledge. Again, if knowledge means no more than identifiable patterns in the available information, the assertion is not really a hypothesis. Allowing entities to extract the patterns in the shared information available to them should naturally produce a corresponding amount of shared knowledge about the situation. If, however, knowledge took on its common, highly individualized meaning, collaboration would not automatically generate shared knowledge for the collaborating entities, even if we were willing to assume, along with the first hypothesis, that the sharing of information has, in fact, led to shared information. Therefore, the second hypothesis is really dependent upon the first hypothesis and its true content is that shared knowledge follows from shared information regardless of whether human beings are involved in the process or not.

The import of these two hypotheses is therefore to separate cleanly the world of technology from the world of men; technology produces information and knowledge which lives in what the doctrine calls “the information domain”, while humans, which form “the cognitive domain”, consume the products of the information domain to generate understanding and decisions [6,7]:

The physical domain is converted into selected data, information, and knowledge by the systems in the information domain. The content of the information domain passes into the cognitive domain through the filter of human perception. The cognitive domain is where awareness, understanding, and beliefs reside and where, as a result of sensemaking, decisions are made.

Traditional analyses have not differentiated the information domain from the cognitive domain or the process of battlespace monitoring from the awareness achieved.

The third hypothesis crosses over this boundary between the information domain and the cognitive domain and enters the cognitive domain. It asserts that shared situational awareness and shared understanding are made possible by shared knowledge through collaboration.

The fourth hypothesis asserts that the shared situational awareness and understanding made possible by shared knowledge, can be transformed into synchronization. According to the doctrine of Network Centric Warfare, the word synchronization carries a different meaning than the conventional meaning of “occurring at the same time” [8]:

In a military context, synchronization can be thought of as an output characteristic of the Command and Control processes that arrange and continually adapt the relationships of actions in time and space in order to achieve the established objectives.

Therefore, the word “orchestration” might have been a better choice than synchronization. In any event, the fourth hypothesis expects that a Command and Control system which possesses full understanding of the situation on the battlefield will be able to orchestrate its forces in such a way as to produce maximum concentration of power against the key enemy assets.

The final hypothesis then asserts that by thus synchronizing its actions, a networked force will be able to generate increased combat power by significantly increasing the speed at which it makes decisions and executes orders as well as by significantly increasing lethality, survivability, and responsiveness.