Meredith A. Hue
A set of metrics and indicators is described, developed within a Net-centric Evaluation Framework (NEF) to assist in the evaluation of Network Centric Warfare (NCW) capability. Specifically, the NEF was framed to support the evaluation of progress in the implementation of Australian NCW using a model-test-model approach applied to major military exercises as described in the Australian NCW Roadmap. The NEF was developed to explore the value proposition of NCW and, ostensibly, to provide a vehicle to facilitate the monitoring and evaluation of progress in implementation of NCW target states towards achieving a seamless, integrated NCW force. The NEF seeks to provide insight into the value of information in its various forms in terms of its contribution towards warfighting effectiveness. A value proposition was derived from the underlying premises of Australian NCW. A set of metrics and indicators, and attendant analytical constructs relating to the value proposition, were then developed to measure emergent net-centric properties being manifested by the Force in the warfighting environment. The NEF spans both the network and human dimensions described in the NCW Roadmap, and includes consideration of quality of information, networking, situational awareness, shared understanding, collaboration, C2 agility, Force agility, and Force operational effectiveness. The NEF was successfully applied during a recent major military exercise to evaluate the extant NCW capability of a Networked Maritime Task Group.
Alexander Cameron, Michael Donovan, John Craig, and Grant Osborne
Increasing operational tempo places a burden on ISR systems to yield timely content. Unfortunately for the military commander, the technology that can assist this endeavour is also creating a level playing field, where asymmetric operations are the norm. The response to this disruption must be rapid and highly exploitive of any new capability, content or data that is opportunistically acquired. In a Network Centric Warfare (NCW) environment, this is a very real scenario. It will be increasingly difficult for military organisations to manage information and content in environments that are becoming complex and highly interactive as they seek to exploit the information edge. This paper explores the concept of a User Defined Operation Picture (UDOP) and how with the capability to govern the acquisition and fusion of dynamically available information and content will greatly enhance the war fighter’s ability to win the war. The paper explores the proposition that within asymmetric environments an identity framework supported by a policy based security context is a method to rapidly enable connection and publishing data sources for consumption by soldiers and mission commanders. Novel techniques will be required that provide a just in time analysis, exploitation and visualisation of data as it enters the battle space picture. Coupled with a concept of a UDOP, commanders will have the ability to draw actionable conclusions from the flood of events and information available. They will also have the ability to allow resource owners at multiple levels of an organization to establish, manage (and override) policy for access to the flow of information along with the ability, using Identity Management systems, to provision infrastructure components when and where needed to support the mission planning and operations. In essence, we will increasingly need to work within rapidly altering structure of capability and vocabulary and not be constrained to the representation of static and ‘familiar’ information and content.
Stephen Hledik
The Australian Defence Force (ADF) is progressing the development of a joint capability for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR). The premise for its evolution has been derived from anecdotal operational experience, the lead of the United States, and ADF’s Network Centric Warfare concept. There is, however, no specific requirement yet stated and endorsed for what such a capability will practically deliver, particularly as an operational outcome. As an integrating capability, joint ISR is envisioned as providing considerable value-add to the individual ISR operations that are routinely conducted using systems owned or accessed by Defence. This is not different to the rationale for any form of joint operation, that combining systems from a range of environments permits the undertaking of more complex missions with improved likelihood of success. This paper examines the capstone doctrine for joint military operations, Joint Operations for the 21st Century, and develops capability guidance for the integrated ISR capability in terms of the key force attributes of Reach, Know, Exploit. The paper also discusses how Defence ISR must consider expanded utility across the options Government has available to employ. By developing this alignment, a clear operational purpose for a joint ISR capability and the characteristics of future ISR systems are described.
Peter Dobias and Kevin B. Sprague
Natural processes with long-term memory require a mathematical description with fractal (power-law) statistics. Two classes of such discrete processes that are of potential interest to the defence community are the fractal point process and the fractal rate point process. An analysis of fatality data from the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq is presented in this paper. The results reinforce the notion that there is a fundamental difference between the two conflicts, with the fatalities in Afghanistan behaving as a typical fractal point process with intermediate intermittency, while the fatalities in Iraq correspond to a fractal rate point process. These findings are supplemented by calculations of intermittency for several combat simulations. Implications of the results for the critical behaviour of the two systems, as well as future directions in terms of intermittency in models, are discussed.
Martin P. Rowe, Harvinder S. Sidhu and Geoffry N. Mercer
Safely navigating the battlefield is required in order to ensure that mission objectives can be achieved with minimum loss of life and equipment. Determining the safest path through the battlefield is complicated by complex and dynamic threat environments. In the air these problems are compounded by the fast pace of combat and the limited number of aircrew that can make pathing decisions. This burden could be removed from the aircrew and given to a safe path determining computational model, but the limited computational power in military aircraft and the short time that solutions need to be generated severely limits the accuracy and usefulness of most models. The Springs and Masses model, however, is computational efficient enough to provide accurate and timely solutions to the full spectrum of safe path problems, including rapidly adapting to “pop-up” threats. The model has also proven to be very robust and can be further extended to better simulate real world threat environments for numerous applications.
Craig Stockings
The Battle of Bardia was the first significant engagement by Australian ground forces in World War Two. It was also an outstanding success. At a cost of 130 killed and 326 wounded, the Australians netted around 40 000 Italian prisoners along with large quantities of arms, rations and equipment. Traditional explanations as to how an inexperienced Australian formation, outnumbered by an Italian force more than twice its size, achieved such a victory have generally fallen victim to ethnic stereotyping or the obscuring effect of the national (Anzac) mythology. Popular misconceptions about indomitable, iron-willed Australians trouncing innately craven, incompetent or even effeminate Italian soldiers prevail—and have done so for more than 60 years. This article seeks to provide a more objective explanation for the battlefield outcome at Bardia by investigating the issue of relative technological advantage on behalf of the attackers over the defending Italian troops. Battles like Bardia won and lost according to the combination of cold, objective, military actualities—not by misguided notions of disparate national characters. In this case one of those factors concerned a serious mismatch in battlefield technology.
