Beyond The Anzac Myth: Relative Technological Advantage And the Battle of Bardia

Review

Craig Stockings

Abstract. The Battle of Bardia was the first significant engagement by Australian ground forces in World War Two. It was also an outstanding success. At a cost of 130 killed and 326 wounded, the Australians netted around 40 000 Italian prisoners along with large quantities of arms, rations and equipment. Traditional explanations as to how an inexperienced Australian formation, outnumbered by an Italian force more than twice its size, achieved such a victory have generally fallen victim to ethnic stereotyping or the obscuring effect of the national (Anzac) mythology. Popular misconceptions about indomitable, iron-willed Australians trouncing innately craven, incompetent or even effeminate Italian soldiers prevail—and have done so for more than 60 years. This article seeks to provide a more objective explanation for the battlefield outcome at Bardia by investigating the issue of relative technological advantage on behalf of the attackers over the defending Italian troops. Battles like Bardia won and lost according to the combination of cold, objective, military actualities—not by misguided notions of disparate national characters. In this case one of those factors concerned a serious mismatch in battlefield technology.

Bardia is a small town on the Mediterranean coast of Libya, in the region of Cyrenaica, approximately 30 km from the Egyptian border. During the early decades of the 20th century it was developed as a military outpost during Italy’s colonisation of the region. Prior to the World War II it was fortified by the construction of an arc of defensive posts, 29 km long, around the town and its small harbour. Bardia was also the site of the first significant Australian land battle of the war. On the morning of 3 January 1941, the Australians attacked and broke through the western face of the Italian defensive perimeter. Bardia village fell late in the afternoon the next day, while resistance in the southern portion of the perimeter did not cease until the next morning. The attack was an outstanding success. It cost the Australians 130 killed and 326 wounded, but netted them around 40 000 Italian prisoners along with large quantities of arms, rations and equipment.

To date, despite its historical significance, little has been written about Bardia. Moreover, that which has been published, particularly by Australian authors, tends to record what happened on the battlefield without any sense of why. How is it that a single inexperienced Australian division routed an Italian garrison more than twice its size with such apparent ease? Where explanations have been attempted they have generally fallen victim to ethic stereotyping or the obscuring effect of national (Anzac) mythology. Popular misconceptions about indomitable, iron-willed Australians crushing innately cowardly, incompetent or even effeminate Italian soldiers prevail—and have done so for more than 60 years. The idea is that there was something unique or innate about the ‘diggers’ that was lacking in Italian troops. Bravery is contrasted to cowardice, mateship to betrayal, and masculinity to perceptions of effeminate behaviour. Only recently, for example, Peter Fitzsimmons best-seller Tobruk attempted to convince his readers that the Australians were ‘sure that once they could get to grips with the Ities they would give them a real hiding like they’d never had before.’ [1] ‘Just cut our blokes loose on the Wops in Bardia’, he contended ‘and it would be all over very quickly.’ [2] Such ethnically-based interpretations are, of course, quite insufficient.

This article seeks to provide a more objective explanation for the Australian victory at Bardia by investigating the issue of their relative technological advantage over the defending Italian troops. Battles like Bardia won and lost according to the combination of cold, objective, military actualities—not by misguided notions of national character.

The Italian garrison at Bardia suffered from a clear inferiority in weaponry. A proper account of the deep, institutionalised and long-term causes for this state of affairs are beyond the scope of this article. The battlefield impact of sub-standard Italian equipment, however, was clear. Despite an overall Italian numerical advantage, in terms of the ‘tools of war’, Bardia was by no means a ‘fair’ fight.

One of the key weapon systems available to the defending garrison, and one most authors condemn them for not making effective use of, were tanks. In total, 128 armoured vehicles were stationed behind the wire. This seems a formidable force, especially given that the Australians were supported by only 23 British tanks. Even acknowledging that 70 Italian tanks were broken down at the time of the Australian attack, Italian armour still outnumbered its equivalent by more than two to one. Why was it then that these 58 working Italian tanks made no real impact on the course of the battle? A simple numerical comparison here obscures the truth. Far more insight can be gained by examining the nature of the vehicles involved: 12 working medium M13 tanks and 46 functional light L3 tanks on the Italian side, against 23 Matilda Mk. II Infantry ‘I’ Tanks supporting the attack.

The Italian L3, more correctly classified as a tankette, was crewed by two and usually armed with two 8 mm machine guns, one mounted in the hull and the other in a very small turret. The vehicle weighed only three tonnes and at 6–14 mm, its armour was wafer thin. [3] In terms of its ability to engage British armour, or its overall usefulness within a modern desert war in 1941, it would impossible to exaggerate exactly how ineffective the L3 really was. With a top speed of 16 kilometres per hour over broken country, it could not be used in conjunction with medium tanks. Nor could its crewman see beyond a very restricted field of vision out to around 200 m. Its hull could be penetrated not only by British anti-armoured rifles but quite often, in the rear and flanks, by small arms as well. British/Australian 2-pounder shells sliced through it like butter. In this context Italian L3s were little more than ‘death-traps’ for their crews. Out of desperation a number at Bardia were dug in as machine gun posts. Others were found with stones piled up on their glacis plates in the hope of adding much needed protection. This completely inadequate vehicle, regarded by its opponents as little more than a nuisance, was the mainstay of Bardia’s armoured force. [4]

The Italian garrison also contained a dozen M13 medium tanks. These vehicles were much heavier than the L3s. They had a crew of four, a turret mounted 47 mm gun with a coaxial machine gun, and two more machine guns in the forward hull. Just because the M13 was a significant improvement on the L3, however, did not mean that it was without shortcomings of its own. Although its 25–30 mm armour was thicker than earlier designs, it was still insufficient protection. Many documented cases described 2-pounder shells passing through Italian M13s, leaving an exit as well as an entry hole. The vehicle’s armour plate often cracked or shattered when hit. Sometimes the bolted hull construction (not welded or cast) was to blame; on other occasions it was the poor Italian steel that was at fault. Many M13 crews resorted to sandbagging or wrapping spare track around their turret and frontal armour for added protection. [5] This practice was not in itself uniquely Italian, but what was distinctive was the fact that without such additional protection M13s could not withstand the same fire that equivalent British or German designs could. In addition, when hit M13s had a nasty habit of catching fire and the fact vehicle commanders also acted as gunners decreased tactical awareness and combat proficiency. Moreover, beset with a chronically low power-to-weight ratio, the M13 was so mechanically unreliable that Rommel was reputed to have once arranged a desert shooting contest between four German PxKwIIIs and four M13s, but only one Italian tank showed up as the other three had broken broke down en route to the range. On top of all this no Italian tank at Bardia was fitted with a radio. Armoured commanders were forced to give orders by flying coloured pennants or by flashing Morse signals. [6]

It is perfectly clear that the battlefield shortcomings of those armoured forces available to the Italians at Bardia limited their employment. Even Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, later the German commander of the Mediterranean theatre, conceded it was asking too much to expect Italian soldiers to carry out armoured attacks, which, ‘because of insufficient armour protection of the individual tanks and deficient armament, [would] be hopelessly smashed by an enemy possessing modern equipment.’ [7] Even prior to Bardia what little faith senior Italian officers might have had in their armour had evaporated. Back in Rome, Major General Guiseppe Mancinelli of the Italian High Command described Italian tanks as ‘little more than pretty mechanical toys … to be offered as targets to the enemy anti-tank guns.’ [8] On the eve of Bardia the Italian rank and file largely felt the same way. [9] Corporal Giorgo Lupi, an artillerymen, considered Italian ‘tankers were good soldiers, though in steel caskets.’ [10] The inadequacy of Italian armour and the attitude it engendered underpinned its lack of influence at Bardia, especially when contrasted to the absolute superiority and decisive impact of the British I Tanks.

British pre-war armoured doctrine had given rise to two basic types of tank—the ‘cruiser’ series, relatively fast vehicles proofed against anti-tank rifle and heavy machine gun fire and tasked to conduct independent armoured operations, and I Tanks charged with advancing slowly during an attack, with the infantry, to destroy machine gun posts, barbed wire and other obstacles to the advance. While a number of versions of ‘cruisers’ were present in the desert with 7 Armoured Division at the time of the Bardia assault, along with Vickers light tanks and various types of armoured cars for scouting and raiding, it was the I Tank which was central to battle at Bardia.

With a crew of four and at 30 tonnes, ten times the weight of an Italian L3, British I Tanks boasted a 2-pounder gun, a 7.92 mm Besa machine gun, and armour plate up to up to 80 mm thick. [11] Such heavy armour made these vehicles slow but at the same time was the key to their battlefield success. These tanks had been designed to defeat any anti-armoured weapon currently in the field and in January 1941, in North Africa, this is exactly what it achieved. For all intents and purpose at Bardia, British I Tanks were invulnerable. They quite literally could not be stopped. During the battle one vehicle sustained 46 direct anti-tank shell hits and while anything breakable such as radio aerials, water cans, lights, and so forth was blown off the tank, it was neither penetrated nor put out of action. One troop travelled under fire a total of 100 km without losing a vehicle. Indeed, although all 23 I Tanks were subjected to heavy fire during the assault on Bardia, only one was damaged beyond repair. [12] Most Italian anti-tank strikes left nothing but a small dent surrounded by powder burns. At the very worst, British crews reported a hit as like ‘having one’s head in a bass drum while it was being beaten.’ [13] The only possible way the defenders at Bardia could stop an advancing I Tank was to knock off a track with a lucky shot or else or to jam a turret ring with shell fragments, and this was usually only a temporary reprieve. [ 14]

At Bardia news of this terrible weapon against which there was no defence spread quickly. [15] To this, first-hand experience of watching anti-tank shells ricocheting off the British tanks was soon added. The sight must have been demoralising. Major General Iven Mackay, the Australian commander, later noted that it was at the appearance of the tanks that many Italians ‘realised the hopelessness of the position and surrendered freely’. [16] It is hardly surprising, under such circumstances, that many chose to yield over suicide. It does not take much to imagine the shock effect and battlefield impact of these unstoppable vehicles rolling towards static Italian defensive positions at Bardia.

There are any numbers of examples during the course of the battle that illustrate the decisive impact of the I Tanks. Australian planners counted on the fact that success at Bardia, to a ‘very considerable degree’, depended on getting them safely within the perimeter ‘at an early stage in the attack’. [17] This was the single most important determinant of the battle and the foundation of the plan of attack. Not only were its phases determined by what I Tanks could do without having to resupply, but the timing of the assault itself was decided by working back from the earliest the tanks could cross the Italian perimeter ditch. Even the break-in point was chosen on the basis that it offered an easy tank crossing point and gently sloping ground over which they could move freely thereafter. [18]

Once the battle was joined Australian faith in the British tanks was justified at every point. A close study of assaults at a company and platoon level at Bardia indicates a clear correlation between success, failure and the presence of I Tanks. Australian advances progressed with relative ease with armoured support and, conversely, often struggled to a halt in the absence of escorting I Tanks. How the course of the battle might have unfolded without British armoured support cannot be known, but in such circumstances the price paid in blood for the victory, had there still been an Australian victory, would no doubt have been considerably higher. [19]

Official and private comment after Bardia, by those who were there, consistently confirmed the critical impact of the I Tanks. For Lieutenant General Richard O’Connor, commanding the corps in which the Australians served, ‘the most important part of the battle was the entry of the I Tanks within the perimeter.’ [20] After that, he noted, ‘it was all fairly plain sailing.’ [21] Mackay confessed two days after the battle that for him ‘every I Tank that could be kept going … was worth a battalion of infantry.’ [22] To Lieutenant Colonel R.M. Jerram, in command of the British tanks, he noted, ‘ [n]one of us is blind to the extraordinary power of your weapon and to its terrific decisive effect.’ [23] For Mackay, ‘the greatest lesson to be learned from the capture of Bardia is the value of heavy tanks. They are literally worth their weight in gold’. [24] ‘Without tanks’, he continued, ‘it would probably have taken weeks of heavy fighting and slaughter to capture such a heavily fortified position’. [25] Mackay was not alone in feeling this way. One of his brigade commanders, Brigadier Arthur (Tubby) Allen knew the secret to his success and after the battle was reported to have exclaimed to Jerram that ‘every time I see you, I must kiss you!’ [26]

Those Australian battalions fortunate to find themselves supported by I Tanks knew the truth. One Australian brigade battle diary entry of 3 January recorded how the armoured giants ‘dominated the points they attacked, trailing Italian death and destruction in their paths.’ [27] Similarly, an unidentified Australian officer reported soon after Bardia fell that the ‘tanks were marvelous—they concentrated their fire at the machine gun positions at each post while we worked around the back—cut the wire and got in with our bayonets.’ [28] On the other side of the equation, the degree of Italian fear and fascination of with the I Tanks was confirmed by Allied prisoners released after Bardia who had all, to a man, been questioned thoroughly by their captors for information on invincible armoured ‘creepers’. [29]

Another measurable, objective and critical determinant of Australian success and Italian failure at Bardia was a dramatic contrast in artillery effectiveness. Certainly, Italian gunners were widely acknowledged as generally the most resolute of the Italian arms during the battle, and at times when firing in a direct role there is no doubt they proved capable of causing the attackers considerable problems. Italian artillery was not, however, as effective as it ought to have been. With more than 300 guns behind the wire any assault on Bardia should have been a difficult and costly enterprise. The fact that it was not suggests something rather fundamental was wrong.

Once again a numerical analysis alone is misleading. A large proportion of Bergonzoli’s artillery, thanks to the Italian Army’s infatuation with massed infantry and the limited technical capability of the Fascist arms industry, was best described as antique. Italy entered the war with only three per cent of its artillery pieces manufactured after 1930. Most artillery held by the Bardia garrison was of World War I vintage, based on even earlier designs, which had not been refurbished adequately. Indeed some pieces, such as the 65mm field gun, complete with ‘grapeshot’ round, would have been better suited to a museum than a modern battlefield in 1941. These guns, and most other 75–100 mm field pieces, were drawn in the main from a vast haul of equipment captured from the Austrians during the last war. [30] The Italian 77 mm weapon actually had a barrel made of bronze with most available ammunition for it produced prior to 1914. The backbone of Italian artillery at Bardia, the 105mm field gun, broke the rule in that it was not Austrian but instead modelled on the French Schneider piece. This was still, however, a 1913 design. There were significant practical problems associated with such an old and mixed force. With ten different models in use difficulties of supply and repair abounded. Importantly, the accuracy of overworn bores was dubious and the range of the Italian weapons much inferior to their British/Australian equivalents. [31] Nor were rates of fire for this mixed force of aging guns helped by a serious shortage of recuperator oil, which often left Italian field pieces stopped in ‘recoil position’, requiring them to be ‘run up’ by hand. [32]

Far more detrimental than even the age, variety, or range of Italian artillery at Bardia was the faulty ordnance it fired. Even when Italian shells found their mark they were just not as lethal as they ought to have been. First, a significant proportion failed to detonate. This was perhaps not surprising given that a captured Italian document of 1 October 1940 revealed that 66 per cent of all ammunition fuses in the 21 Corps artillery group were out of date and untrustworthy. There is good reason to suspect the same applied, to a greater of lesser extent, across the board. Indeed, so many Italian shells had fallen within Australian battalion areas outside Bardia in late December without detonating that an order was passed to collect the unexploded bombs to be taken behind the lines for detailed British examination. [33]

During the assault the frequency of faulty Italian shells led to a multitude of observations like those made by Lieutenant P.S. Whitelaw, of 2/2 Field Regiment, who remembered seeing a great many ‘rounds that were not bursting and turning head over heels across the desert’. [34] Closer to the wire, Trooper T. Craig, a British I Tank crewman was ‘astonished by the number of enemy shells which failed to explode’ [35] On his heels, an Australian signaller at the break-in point remembered a shell that, ‘lobbed about 40 yards in front of us, then flew in the air again, did a few skips and pulled up a yard or so in front of the truck.’ [36] A company commander in a different brigade observed that ‘at least one, and sometimes two, out of ten failed to explode.’ [37]

The true scope of the problem was worse than faulty fuses. Even when Italian shells detonated they occasionally failed to fragment. Those that did revealed seriously defective shrapnel patterns. From an early stage senior Allied officers observed that Italian shells did not burst with anything like the ‘snap of the German artillery in the last war.’ [38] They were noisy, but rarely deadly. Poor manufacture, a lack of quality control, and faulty basic design saw most Italian shells burst upwards rather than outwards. Beyond a metre or two from the point of explosion the shrapnel effect was therefore ineffectual, with a lethal area restricted to a narrow cone immediately to the rear of the explosion. Compared to the deadly, all-round, daisy-cutting effect of the British 25-pounder shell, fragmentation was almost nonexistent. For this reason practically all Australian wounds from shellfire were fatal and the result of ‘direct hits’, where there should have been a much higher proportion of fragmentation wounds. [39]

Examples of ineffectual Italian shelling before and during the battle were manifest. By chance, for example, an Italian shell landed on an Australian Q-Store outside the Bardia perimeter in late December. The Quartermaster, despite being half buried in soil, rocks and groceries, suffered his worst injury when a can of evaporated milk, falling from where it had been blown into the air, landed on his forehead. [40] During their assault time and time again Australians were blown off their feet, shook themselves, and continue on. Observers in one Australian brigade were suspicious of their own casualties in this regard in that there ‘seemed less than there should be expected considering the width of the crossing and the intensity of the enemy’s shelling’. [41] One soldier concluded that ‘there must have been something wrong with their ammunition, for I’ve seen men knocked head over tip, but get to their feet, staggering and silly in the head, but unhurt.’ [42] At the same time an Australian company in the south of the Bardia position, when mistakenly under friendly fire for a short time, made specific comment of the clear difference in power between British and Italian shells. [43] On the last day of the battle Captain R. Honner of 19 Brigade was ‘horrified to see the first two sections and then the third blown over.’ [44] ‘As nothing moved in the dust,’ he thought, ‘this is it—one platoon gone—how long will the rest last?’ [45] After a moment Honner’s dazed soldiers scrambled up and forward to regain their alignment.

The fundamental point about these examples is that none of them should have happened. There should have been no such close shaves had Italian shells exploded as they were supposed to and as their British/Australian equivalents certainly did. An Australian brigadier noted that as a consequence of poor quality shells Australian troops developed a wholesome contempt for them. [46] Soldiers under effective shellfire are generally fearful but seldom ‘contemptuous’. In his opinion the Italians lost at Bardia ‘because of the ineffectiveness of his shells more than any other factor.’ [47] He was close to the mark. Had Italian artillery fire been effective the number of Italian guns would have ensured many more Australian casualties. How the flow on effects of this, and the altered tactical situation that would have arisen, might have affected the outcome of the battle is impossible to judge. What is safe to conclude is that relative artillery inferiority was a key ingredient to Italian defeat.

In stark contrast to the relative ineffectiveness of Italian artillery at Bardia, was the efficacy of British/Australian shellfire. To begin, as noted, the attackers had superior tools. The British 25-pounder field gun was modern and effective. Just as importantly, in January 1941 artillery was still acknowledged by the attackers as a key ingredient for success against a prepared defensive position like Bardia. Lessons learned on the Western Front by Australian commanders served their troops well. The Australian headquarters, for example, postponed the attack by 24 hours until sufficient stocks of artillery ammunition (400 rounds per gun for a total of around 36 000 rounds) could be brought forward. [48] More importantly, although less than half the number guns were available to the attackers than to the Italian garrison, the method of their employment ensured a degree of superiority that again belied any simple numerical comparison.

The mass of firepower 6 Division concentrated against the initial break-in point was overwhelming, even when measured against World War I battles famous for the weight of Allied bombardment. At Bullecourt in April 1917, for example, 160 guns supported a divisional attack on a front of 2 750 m—one gun for every 17 m of enemy line. By 1918 the British made artillery bombardment something of a science and estimated that at least one gun was required to neutralise every 23 m of enemy trench. This was the formula used at Amiens in August 1918, and was the basis of planning for further assaults against the Hindenburg Line. According to such a formula, for the initial bombardment against a 700 metre section of the Italian line at the break-in point at Bardia, 30 guns were required. Double this number were actually used against the posts in front of 2/1 Battalion’s initial assault, with one gun firing for every 12 m of Italian perimeter. [49] All this fire was employed against a fundamentally system of perimeter posts nothing like the comprehensive, in-depth defences faced by the Allies in France during the last war. It is also worth noting that this was also a much denser concentration of fire than that employed against Rommel at El Alamein more than 18 months later.

The effect of such an overwhelming concentration of firepower was predictable. By the time the Australians arrived Italian dead were strewn about the posts in the vicinity of the break-in point, most with artillery wounds, some cut in half. [50] It was hardly surprising after such a pulverising barrage that the dazed defenders in this vicinity showed little resolve. Without overhead protection at their firing positions, most of the Italians at the initial point of the attack were captured hiding in their underground dug-outs. Their choice was simple; take cover or die. In the words of an one Australian officer, ‘ [t]hey were caught like rabbits in a burrow’. [51]

This pattern was repeated throughout the battle. Second only to the presence of I Tanks, effective artillery fire generally determined success or failure for Australian sub-unit attacks on Italian posts. Australian shellfire pounded the defenders relentlessly, lifting only at the last moment as the attackers arrived to reveal stunned Italian soldiers already blasted into submission. All the while dedicated counter-battery fire devastated Italian batteries trying to respond to the Australian attacks. It is noteworthy that where Australian assaults faltered the absence of I Tanks was often accompanied by an absence of comprehensive artillery support. [52] The wider point is that like the comparative advantages in armour, relative artillery superiority, both in weapons and their employment, was a critical objective ingredient to Australian success at Bardia.

The model established thus far regarding the material mismatch in the ‘tools of war’ between defender and attacker at Bardia is equally valid in terms of infantry weapons. First, there was an extraordinary multiplicity of Italian small arms in use during the battle, many obsolescent. Of the three pistols in service, the Model 1889 revolver and the Glisenti Model 1910 automatic were outdated, unreliable and unsuited to the desert. [53] The same was true of two aging 9 mm submachine guns (OVP and Beretta 1918/30), whose undependability was not offset by a limited number of much improved Beretta 38A weapons. Italian rifles in use at Bardia were based on a Mannlicher-Carcano clip-loading, bolt-action design of 1891, firing rather low-velocity 6.5 mm rounds. In a staggering display of poor management, in 1937 the Italians decided to replace this bullet with a harder hitting 7.35 mm version. Production of the 1938 pattern Mannlicher-Carcano rifles to accommodate this round commenced before the war but there was insufficient time to complete the program and it was abandoned in 1940. At Bardia this meant that both calibres were in use, sometimes within units, compounding an already difficult supply situation. [54]

Italian machine guns were more troublesome even than sidearms or rifles, and more numerous with seven different types of incompatible machine gun ammunition in use at Bardia. The Breda Model 30 6.5 mm weapon, the primary light machine employed, had an awful reputation for unreliability due to ammunition stoppages caused by the need to lubricate each round with oil before chambering. In the desert this oil-pump function invariably clogged with grit, rendering the weapon useless. The Model 30 also had a low rate of fire and its fixed bipod made it difficult to carry and unstable on uneven ground. The Model 30s at Bardia were complemented by Fiat-Revelli Model 14 6.5 mm machine guns. These were bulky, complicated and inferior weapons which had seen action in World War I. They were fed by a box of rounds which were also oiled as they entered the chamber—making Model 14s similarly prone to stoppages. In some cases Model 14s had been converted to Model 35s which came with tripods and air-cooled barrels. Although belt fed 8 mm rounds were sometimes used in modified Model 35s, the decreased chance of stoppages was offset by a nasty tendency for the weapon to ‘cook off’ after periods of sustained fire (as a consequence of its ‘closed bolt’ design), discharging a stream of bullets without the operator pulling the trigger. The most common Italian medium machine gun used at Bardia was the 8mm Breda Model 37. The basic problem for this weapon was an unusual feed system where used cartridges were returned to a tray which was ejected after all rounds were fired. The idea was to save and reload cartridges but most were damaged during the ejection process, rendering the exercise pointless. Its low rate of fire due to undersized ammunition clips was also a significant shortcoming. [55]

In contrast to their Italian equivalents, British/Australian small arms were modern, robust and lethal. The British standard Enfield .38 calibre (9.2 mm) revolver was simple and reliable. The .303 calibre (7.9 mm) Short Magazine Lee Enfield rifle, although introduced to British Army in 1907, had by 1941 been developed up to the ‘Mark III’ standard and was, unquestionably, one of the finest service rifles ever produced. [56] The two British/Australian .303 calibre machine guns employed at Bardia, the light Bren gun (with a 29 round magazine) and medium water cooled, belt-fed Vickers gun, both proved so reliable and effective they stayed in service throughout and well beyond World War II. The contrast could not have been starker.

If the poor quality of small arms was not problematic enough, the Italian Model 35 hand grenade, an important weapon in the close quarters fighting in and around the perimeter posts, was also poorly designed and ineffective. These small bombs had a black cylindrical base, a rounded red painted top, and fitted quite easily into the palm of a hand. The basic problem with these money boxes, shaving sticks or pillar boxes, as they were christened by the Australians, was that they were dangerous only if they exploded practically on top of their intended victim. A man standing a metre away was all but safe. [57] One Australian soldier described the difference between his Mills 36 grenade and its Italian equivalent by noting the former ‘exploded with a crunch and sprayed shrapnel for yards’, whereas the latter ‘contained small shot, the size of bird shot which many of our chaps scorned as kids stuff.’ [58] As was the case with many Italian shells, there were numerous instances of Australians knocked off their feet during the battle by Italian grenades only to pick themselves up without injury. [59]

Italian infantry support weapons were little better. The ineffectiveness of the 47 mm anti-tank gun against the British I Tanks has already been noted. Beyond its ineffectual hitting power, the inaccuracy of the weapon forced Italian gunners to close to suicidal ranges to engage even soft-skinned targets. The anti-tank gun also had a limited traverse and there was no protective bullet shield for its crews. In desperation, a number of Italian positions abandoned their anti-tank weapons and resorted, unsuccessfully, to using improvised petrol bombs. By contrast the British 2-pounder (40mm) anti-tank gun often mounted on a ‘portee’ (or cut-down lorry) was, due to the weaknesses of Italian armoured vehicles, entirely satisfactory. With the 2-pounder shell’s habit of penetrating weak Italian armour plate and then bouncing around inside vehicles, more often than not all that it left was the ‘ghastly mangled remains’ of Italian crewmen. [60]

Overall, Italian solders fought for their lives at Bardia with inferior weapons. The conclusion reached by Australian soldiers during the battle, that nothing their adversaries possessed was cause to lose faith in their own, was entirely justified. The official British account of operations from November 1940 to January 1941 suggested the psychological impact of a lack of confidence in their own weapons undermined Italian aggression, making them important contributor to British/Australian success. [61] As noted by an Italian headquarters despatch to Rome, ‘one cannot break steel armour with fingernails alone.’ [62] In contrast, thanks to inter-war research and development, the relative effectiveness of British/Australian weapons in this theatre in the early stages of World War II was unquestionable.

There are many other examples of insufficient or inadequate equipment which hamstrung the Italian defensive effort at Bardia. A complete lack of radios at brigade level and below, for example, meant the Italians could neither react to, nor surprise the Australians. By contrast, without exception the attackers used wireless and telephone cable systems (in excess of 160km) for communications between brigade and divisional headquarters. The lack of lower-level Italian wireless contact effectively ruled out impromptu organisation and coordination between defending battalion sub-sectors during the battle. At the same time, with the initiative and with much less need to coordinate responses to unforeseen enemy action, the Australians attached wireless vans often down to a unit level. Where this was not possible they focused on alternative communications such as runners, despatch riders, field telephones and visual signallers. The Italians, with no Signals Platoons within their infantry battalions, or any equivalent of a Signal Corps whatsoever, had no such flexibility. [63]

At an individual level most Italians fighting at Bardia carried personal webbing and equipment that was designed (and in some cases produced) prior to World War I. Leather waist belts dated from 1891 and cartridge pouches, positioned to the front and therefore uncomfortable and impractical when lying down, from 1907. This was quite removed from the new 1937 British pattern webbing worn by the Australians. With the exception of desert goggles, very few items of Italian equipment were produced or supplied specifically for African conditions. Italian officers, for example, went without vehicle compasses, necessitating risky stops and movements away to take bearings with hand-held devices. A proportion of defenders at Bardia ‘protected’ themselves with tropical helmets actually made of cork covered with light khaki canvas, of little use against razor sharp shrapnel shards. Even Italian (soldier’s) uniforms, while varying widely in styles of tunics, shirts, trousers, breeches and shorts, were of consistently poor quality. Their seams either came apart or rotted away. Boots were issued with ‘cardboard’ soles that disintegrated rapidly, while buttons, thread, needles, and even rank/unit badges were in short supply. [64] The overall situation was perhaps best described by Captain L.H. Browne, a British officer of the Long Range Desert Group in mid-1941, who noted his men felt ‘sorry for the Italians … I don’t mean that in a patronising way’, explained Browne, ‘it was just that their equipment was bad in comparison with ours’. [65]

A great many factors contributed to the battlefield outcome at Bardia. Primary among them was a clear relative advantage for the attackers over the defenders regarding the ‘tools of war’. Italian armour was ineffectual, British I Tanks invulnerable. Italian artillery was varied, decrepit and delivered faulty shells. Australian guns were effective and well employed, particularly in their devastating concentration at the point of break-in. Italian infantry and infantry support weapons were also second-rate compared to their British/Australian equivalents. With all this in mind, in terms of seeking a real explanation for victory, the standing historiographical infatuation with the innate Australian cunning, skill, and courage begins to lose its lustre. So too, conceptions of cowardly Italians giving up their impregnable fortress for the want of a will to fight appears equally unsatisfactory. Far less emotive but far more objective factors were at work on the battlefield at Bardia. Many were connected to the relative technological advantage of the attackers over the defenders.

References