2 THE CORPUSCULAR THEORY OF MATTER

The purpose of this essay is therefore to explore the ontological nature of the constituents of matter by asking the question: what is an electron? But, there is nothing much we can do with this question as stated, beyond that is, merely asking it. To approach the question concerning the Being of the constituents of matter productively we need to sharpen the language well beyond this general formulation. The sharpest formulation comes in Albert Einstein’s paper Can Quantum Mechanical Description of Physical Reality Be Considered Complete? which he published in 1935 together with Boris Podolsky and Nathan Rosen. To enter the question at that historic point, however, we must establish the terms of the discussion Einstein undertakes there. And that in turn requires we outline the corpuscular theory of matter as it stood in 1935 and trace the path along which it got there. In doing so we do not aim at recording the history of quantum mechanics; our only goal here is to establish the proper ground upon which to place the ontological question we had posed. Consequently, we shall describe the development of quantum mechanics not as the customary triumphal march of discovery recounted in standard historical texts, but rather as the thorny way of accommodation to the epistemological position that the scientific community had imposed upon itself.