Library
July 2005
A numerical study using AUTODYN-2D was made in order to examine how to reduce the effect of a rear flyer plate from an explosive reactive armour (ERA) impacting a lightweight armoured vehicle hull at normal incidence. Various designs of protection systems were simulated. The dependence on deformation of the vehicle hull on the design of protection system is reported.
Due to the current and ongoing international instability, the threat of future surface-to-air missile (SAM) attacks on commercial aircraft is real. Stop-gap measures to protect aircraft against man-portable air-defence (MANPAD) missile threats need to be evaluated until commercially viable systems are developed, tested and installed.
Since dominating the high ground has always been of considerable interest to warfighters, it follows that future warfare will be dominated by the ultimate high ground—space. The most significant problem plaguing terrestrial-based communications, surveillance and weapons systems is that they are often constrained to line-of-sight, which is limited to very short ranges, particularly when the land platform is at low heights. Space-based systems offer enormous potential as platforms for repeating communications, conducting surveillance and supporting navigation over vast areas compared to terrestrial-based systems. One of the difficulties with operations in space is the general lack throughout the world’s defence forces of an agreed taxonomy. While doctrine (such as US Joint Publication JP 3-14 Joint Doctrine for Space Operations [1]) and agreed terms do exist for a number of areas of space operations, the taxonomies provided tend to be focussed on particular areas and defined around existing systems and applications. There is therefore a need for a comprehensive top-level approach to the description of the constituent elements of space operations. An important characteristic of this description is that it needs to take into account the impact of space on the providers of space services, as well as the users of these services, and the impact of space on other battlespace entities that are not direct users of space. This paper therefore proposes a taxonomy for military space operations.
Messaging is an accepted mechanism to implement data dissemination between tactical C3I applications. Certified Message Delivery (CMD) ensures in addition to the ensured delivery of a message by a robust messaging engine, the successful consumption of the message by the recipient application. It also ensures that the status acknowledgement is made available to the sender application for monitoring of data dissemination and re-propagation of messages that failed consumption. There are various ways in which Certified Message Delivery can be implemented. This paper discusses a robust and reliable implementation of CMD in tactical C3I applications in which messaging has been adopted as a mechanism for data dissemination. The implementation is asynchronous, with no blocking at the sender’s end. It is based on a network configuration in which there is an application server and database server in the local area network (LAN) of every formation/unit headquarters (HQ), and the LANs of the formation/unit HQs are connected to each other via a wide area network (WAN). Clients existing at every HQ, access the local application server, which in turn accesses the local database server, and there is a messaging server, which is a service that takes care of dissemination of data.
Security is of fundamental importance for a variety of applications where wireless sensor networks are deployed, especially in military operations, where strategic decisions are based on data gathered and processed by them. In this paper we introduce a protocol based on symmetric key encryption and strong tamper protection for secure data delivery in a network of wirelessly connected sensors.
The defence communities in the US and UK are undergoing an almost revolutionary change as they endeavour to operate Capability Management. For Capability Management to achieve its potential, a mechanism is required to enable all capability components to be managed coherently. It is our premise that unless you can measure capability you cannot manage it. This paper proposes a framework for managing the three generic components of capability, namely People, Process and Materiel. The paper also illustrates how this framework can be used to manage People Capability, in the context of Military Staff Training, and how this can be linked to Operational Risk in a rigorous manner that is both militarily and scientifically credible.
D. Adamy, EW 102: A Second Course in Electronic Warfare , Artech House, Norwood, Massachusetts, 2004.