Anna B. Crowley
Recent experimental studies on muzzle blast overpressure histories of an 81mm mortar system have revealed a number of reproducible features following the main blast front. Some of these features are shock fronted, with pressure rises of similar magnitude to that in the main blast front. The time lapse indicates that these may be associated with the precise geometry of the projectile. A study was therefore undertaken, using our previously validated CFD code, to examine the evolution of the flowfield behind the blast front. The primary concern is to achieve an improved understanding of the changing flowfield, and how this determines the features of the experimentally measured pressure history.
Ian Horsfall, Nadeem Ehsan and Wilf Bishop
Four types of light-armour piercing ammunition were fired against mild steel, high hardness steel and ceramic faced composite armour targets. The ammunition included three types of 7.62×51 mm AP and the 30-06 APM2 (7.62×63 mm) projectile. The penetrative capability of the ammunition was assessed in terms of both the ballistic limit velocity and the ballistic limit energy. The 7.62×51 mm FFV projectile, which has a tungsten carbide core, had the lowest ballistic limit velocity against all target types. The three steel cored projectiles (Hirtenberger, P80 and 30-06) showed variation in their relative performance dependent upon target type. Examination of the ballistic limit energy showed that the sharper pointed projectiles performed better against strong targets. However, against weak targets, blunt projectiles performed better as they promoted plug formation and shear failure in the target. This was in agreement with the calculated loads to initiate penetration. For the ceramic-faced targets the Florence analysis [1] was found to produce reasonable agreement with the experimental results when the effects of both the projectile core and jacket where taken into account.
Friedrich W. Benz
One of the main efforts in the process of the digitisation of the battlefield is to build up an integrated information system. The following article describes the approach of the German Army to integrate the Command, Control and Information System, the Battlefield Management System and the developing Command and Fire Control Systems to form an Army Integrated Information System. The Army Integrated Information System is then described as a highly complex integrated system of command and control means comprising information processing means and systems on the one hand and information transmission means and systems on the other. An assessment is then made of the contribution of the integrated system to the individual phases of the command and control process. Within this integrated system, the interchange of information and the impact on the command and control process are discussed and some aspects are indicated for further examination with respect to information management. Attention then focuses on the relationship between the Army Integrated Information System and the Composite Reconnaissance System. Finally, some comments are provided on the further development of the Army Integrated Information System and thus of the Army integrated system of command and control means.
Peter L. Lambert
The Australian Army has been attempting to develop a computerised command support system since the mid-1970s and appears to have finally succeeded with the 1999 deployment of the Battlefield Command Support System (BCSS). The development path was a long and difficult one, beset by the nature of the software engineering approach, challenged by the rapid explosion of information technology and constrained by the nature of relationships between the user, sponsor, acquirer and developer. This paper describes the background to the development of the Australian Tactical Command Support System (AUSTACSS) and its eventual evolution into the Battlefield Command Support System. The paper also outlines the new management approaches, evolutionary development principles and contractual arrangements utilised to produce success and win the battle for an Army command support system.
Vince Polito and Ian C. Luckraft
This paper outlines an investigation into combining multiple images of a selected scene into one image data space using digital image processing techniques. Due to the rapid development of image processing technology, electro-optic devices, and other related systems, the modern battlefield is becoming densely populated with different imaging platforms. Currently no process exists by which multiple images of the same scene, taken from various platforms, are integrated into one image data space. If various image formats, taken from different perspectives are fused into one common data space, then intercommunications between the imaging platforms can be achieved. A technique known as geometric transformation has been used. This utilises the collection of control points from all image sets, which are matched appropriately so that a second order polynomial equations can be fitted, this then enables the construction of a common image domain. Such a technique can be used for pre-selecting targets for submunitions or can allow submunitions to select and allocate targets when delivered in a salvo to target a common area. This paper outlines the process required to extract and match common features from a number of similar images and then uses these points to fit such a second order polynomial which links the images together. The paper concludes with an outline of the types of operations where this process can be employed.
Simon J. King and Mark A. Richardson
If commanders are to have the freedom to move around the battlespace to locations where they can best influence the battle at the critical time and place they must be sure in the knowledge that they can do so undetected. Infrared (IR) sensors, with ever increasing sensitivity, are now well established in the land environment. IR signature management is therefore becoming evermore pertinent in that environment. Innovative design and the use of modern materials can reduce the external temperature range of a vehicle but can be expensive. It is therefore paramount that vulnerable areas on a vehicle are identified so that appropriate thermal camouflage can be applied in the most cost-effective manner. High-fidelity thermal signature models are available but are time consuming to run and heavy on computer processing power. A simple, easy to use thermal signature model would provide a ready alternative to the more exacting complex models. Whilst not attempting to replace the high-fidelity models for the detailed analysis of thermal signatures, a simple model would have utility as a first filter of trials data and the initial testing of signature reduction concepts. A single temperature difference model of the Main Battle Tank for input into a Minimum Resolvable Temperature Difference (MRTD) model is presented. The model is used to predict detection range reduction and thereby identify the areas on a MBT that require thermal signature reduction.
Michael L. Darby
The major shift in simulation to date has been in the orientation or role of the participant. In the past, analysts studied the world as an external reviewer using simulation to provide insight into the real-world system. Students trained on replications of systems to learn specific tasks and practice certain skills with respect to the replicated rea-world system. However, the domain of simulation has now spread to the digitised battlefield. As a result, through emulation techniques defined by interconnectivity and interoperability requirements and constraints, we can now climb into the simulation via the Synthetic Environment (SE) and experience the ‘realities’ of the system we are studying or training with. While in the past, we used training systems to teach specific tasks, the use of simulation is just beginning to evolve to emulate an operationally valid, authoritative, real-world environment. This shift in focus, capability and the participant role has both great promise and great risk. The promise brings repeatable, safe, visually accurate, inclusive, seamless, training on demand capability. However, the risk is in direct correlation to the promise and is associated with the simulation training system’s development process as engineers attempt to capture the actual real-world environment and create the artificial digital emulation. The associated risk is that current engineering practices in both Systems and Software Engineering do not provide sufficient process models, policies, standards or tools that can be leveraged in a simulation program. Furthermore, simulation as a body of science does not have a collective scientific paradigm that establishes development practices let alone the final “system” validation. Now more than ever, simulation development professionals need defined practices and standards and tools in order to produce the right environment for the right requirements at an appropriate cost.
Alan C. McLucas
Study of a number of accident cases provided valuable insights into the behaviour of people and the complex, dynamic systems-of-systems of which they are an integral part. Various decision-makers failed to understand what was happening around them; they failed to learn from incidents that occurred along the way, and then made errors of judgement or errors in their assessments and management of risks. When a number of non-accident cases were studied in the same way it was found that managers also lacked understanding of the complexity they faced. They were often found lacking when making decisions or when developing strategies involving significant risks. The research suggests there is scope to build management interventions designed to correct these failures to understand, to learn and to manage risks. A critical step is to set the context that enables recognition of patterns of behaviour. This leads to surfacing the underlying systemic structures typical of these complex, dynamic problems.
Rowland E. Dickinson
Debate exists on the use of the Macedonian sarissa at the time of Alexander the Great. Although considered the weapon that enabled Alexander’s victories at the time of Polybius, the sarissa was considered to be an unwieldy weapon that was useable only under the most ideal of conditions. In this paper it is argued that, at the time of Alexander, the shorter sarissa 12 (Macedonian) cubits long (4.1m) was in use as it had greater manoeuvrability than later longer versions. Using an engineering analysis of the physical aspects of the each of the possible lengths of the sarissa, it is concluded that the increase in length from 4.1m was sufficient to remove the manoeuvrability of the sarissa-armed troops leading to the highly restricted conditions for its use related to us by Polybius. By considering tactical displays and individual combat it is shown that formations armed with the shorter sarissa were very manoeuvrable. The use of the sarissa is then considered in several incidents and major battles of Alexander’s campaigns. Finally the paper discusses the logic of extending the sarissa’s length and analyses the results of doing so.
