Manfred Held
After the Gulf War, 308 armoured vehicles were inspected to investigate the damage caused by kinetic energy (KE) rounds and shaped charge (SC) warheads. The resulting data is analysed and compared to data from World War II 1944/45, the 1967 Six-day War, the 1983 Yom Kippur War as well as with the hit distribution data used by Germany, the USA and the UK for tank design and vulnerability prediction. It is shown that none of these correlate with the Gulf War data. Analysis is also conducted of the Coalition ammunition used and it is shown that the KE rounds (from type 3 on) and the SC warheads (from type 2 on) were overmatched to the T55, T62 and T72 tanks used by the Iraqi forces.
Alan Nott
Avoidance of electrical explosive hazards from a proliferation of electrically initiated explosive devices in ordnance systems in an increasingly intense military electromagnetic environment, requires the proper determination of safe operating distances and procedures for emitter and ordnance combinations. This paper addresses threats arising in such situations. It presents some aspects of the policy, standards, philosophy, analysis and trials work performed in Australia to minimise such threats so that ordnance and weapon systems will remain safe and suitable for service. The current situation and capability in Australia are discussed, together with new and emerging techniques, which may have application in this field. Concern is expressed at the continuing lack of a suitable electromagnetic environment generation capability and the diminishing instrumentation, trials capability and experience within Australia. Recent changes to the role of the Australian Ordnance Council, and the creation of the Joint Armament Logistic Organisation have some potential to ameliorate this situation.
Jim Storr
A recurrent theme in command and control (C2) concerns the most appropriate size of deployed HQs. Opinions vary, and the subject is clouded by the impending impact of digital battle management systems. However, the question is not directly related to digitization. HQs in the World War II were considerably smaller than at present. Their subsequent growth is attributed to the increasing complexity of modern war. But how much more complex is modern war? Is the attendant increase in HQ size justified? Indeed, how should one justify the size of an HQ? This paper discusses the role of an HQ in supporting command and control and suggests six linked premises: that the quantity of information used to make battlefield decisions is very small; that operation orders should be, can be, and have been very short; that very few staff are required to produce those orders; that there is significant advantage in making and disseminating decisions much faster than at present; that decisions do not have to be as good if they are produced significantly faster; and that there are significant advantages in deploying smaller HQs. These premises are considered using historical examples, apparent inconsistencies within doctrine and practice, and two novel models (of decision-making and organisational complexity). The paper then proposes a hypothesis that formations and units with small, closely integrated staffs can be significantly more effective than those with HQs of current dimensions. Discussion of the emergent hypothesis suggests a re-evaluation of the apparent complexity of modern war; of the nature of operational control; of decision-making methods; and of the impending effects of digitization. Future concepts for C2 organisations require further consideration, and perhaps experiment.
Malcolm H. Mills
Much attention is paid in the management literature as to why software-intensive command and control projects fail during the acquisition process. But many do enter service successfully only to fail during operational use, sometimes catastrophically. The author suggests that quite fundamental differences between the natural characteristics of command and the virtual rule-bound properties of software are a major cause of these catastrophic incidents. Some well-publicised examples are used to illustrate the extent of the breakdown between command and automation that can occur in real operations. Since in the future, it is likely that military operations will be more complex and unpredictable than those of the past, the author suggests that Military Users should be increasingly on guard to prevent technological hubris from constraining the operational flexibility of future systems. It is suggested that Military Users should take an active leadership role alongside Industry in the procurement process to ensure the ‘Risky Dualism’ between command and automation is addressed during system design, and not when it is too late.
Roger S. Picton
In order to achieve high-resolution pictures of the ground, it is necessary to achieve high resolution along the radar beam (range resolution), and across the beam (cross-range resolution). High range resolution is achieved by the use of pulse compression. Cross-range resolution is a function of antenna beamwidth and target range. High cross-range resolution, therefore, is achieved by producing a radar antenna with a very narrow effective beamwidth. To achieve this, a real antenna would have to be made impracticably large. The solution is to find some way of synthesising the performance of a very large antenna out of one that is physically far smaller. This review article outlines the principles behind Synthetic Aperture Radar, and discusses the processing techniques used in the production of the final imagery. The technique of Inverse SAR (ISAR) is also briefly discussed.
Michael L. Darby
ion - The Process
