Library

Volume 16, Number 2, July 2013

Book Review

    Abstract

    Review

    L.A. Rafferty, N.A. Stanton, and G.H. Walker, The Human Factors of Fratricide, Ashgate 2012.

    Reviewed by: Paul Salmon, University of the Sunshine Coast, Queensland, Australia

    Fratricide, or ‘friendly fire’ as it is more commonly known, is becoming an increasing problem in military conflicts. During the first gulf war, almost a quarter of the casualties suffered by US forces and over a third of those suffered by British forces were caused by fratricide [1,2]. At the time of writing, over 50 troops have been killed in fratricide incidents during International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operations in the current Afghanistan war [3]. Although the problem has been around for as long as there has been armed conflict, the evidence suggests that it is becoming more prevalent in modern day military systems.

    Despite its catastrophic outcomes and high profile nature, friendly fire remains ambiguous, both in terms of its causes and how to prevent it. Human Factors, the discipline that exists in order to understand and enhance the performance of complex sociotechnical systems, has a lot to offer in explaining and preventing friendly fire incidents; however, surprisingly there has been little in the way of Human Factors driven research into the concept. Rafferty, Stanton and Walker address this with The Human Factors of Fratricide, an ambitious text that presents a new model of fratricide, a methodology for studying fratricide incidents, case study analyses of fratricide incidents and finally a set of principles designed to help prevent future friendly fire incidents.

    Chapter 1 examines the literature surrounding fratricide, offering a detailed critique of current theoretical models and related concepts, culminating with a prototype model of fratricide, the Famous Five of Fratricide (F3) model. The model is based on Rafferty et al’s conclusion that five factors appear to play a key role in fratricide incidents: communication, cooperation, coordination, schema and situation awareness. This chapter provides a useful introduction to the concept and covers the related literature well. One appealing feature is the way in which the F3 model was developed. Fratricide-related concepts identified in the literature were counted based on frequency of occurrence, which led to the identification of the five factors. Following this, grounded theory was used to identify how the factors were proposed to be related with one another in the literature. Social network analysis was then used to model and assess these relationships. The F3 model therefore not only depicts the five key factors underpinning fratricide incidents according to the collective literature, but also depicts the strength of the relationships between the factors. For example, the model shows strong relationships between situation awareness and schema, communication, and coordination. Another important conclusion from Chapter 1 is that fratricide is a systems phenomenon and thus should be studied from a systems perspective. This is in line with contemporary Human Factors research and adds further novelty to Rafferty et al’s approach.

    In Chapter 2, Rafferty et al gather validation evidence for the F3 model by applying it to the Challenger II tank fratricide incident that occurred during the second gulf war in 2003. In examining the incident, Rafferty et al use an actual and ideal scenario approach in which the actual incident itself is examined along with an ideal scenario in which performance was optimum and the fratricide incident did not happen. The actual and ideal scenario case study approach is used throughout the book and is another of its appealing features: the actual scenario analysis examines what happened in detail, whereas the equally detailed ideal scenario analysis provides a benchmark against which to compare the incident. This goes above and beyond the usual accident analysis approach adopted in Human Factors texts and makes for interesting reading. In Chapter 2, factors from the F3 model are mapped onto the key contributory factors from the Challenger II incident and the interactions between factors are noted. The analysis demonstrates how all of the key contributory factors from the Challenger II tank incident can be mapped onto the F3 model, providing initial validation evidence for the model.

    Throughout Chapters 1 and 2 Rafferty et al note that methods suited for studying fratricide incidents are sparse. Chapter 3 presents a discussion of the utility of a selection of Human Factors methods for examining fratricide incidents, leading to the conclusion that the Event Analysis of Systemic Teamwork (EAST) [4] framework may be the most suitable of those discussed. An EAST analysis of the Operation Provide Comfort fratricide incident in which two US Black Hawk Helicopters were shot down by two US F-15 jets is then presented. The outputs are used to test EAST against a set of criteria that Rafferty et al set out as requirements for fratricide analysis methodologies. The analysis presented is detailed, and confirms the applicability of the EAST framework for studying fratricide incidents. The Fratricide Event Analysis of Systemic Teamwork (FEAST) method is thus proposed. Further, the analysis again demonstrates the presence of all five factors from the F3 model as contributory factors. Interestingly, the analysis also suggests that there may be an optimum level for each of the five factors during military performance, and that levels both above and below this may be an indicator of the potential for fratricide incidents.

    Having proposed a new model and a methodology to investigate fratricide, the book now moves on to explore in depth the factors underpinning it. To do so, Chapters 4, 5, and 6 present detailed FEAST analyses of fratricide incidents observed by the authors during their direct observations of military training scenarios. The move from the use of retrospective case studies to the examination of data derived from military training scenarios is refreshing and provides compelling outputs. In Chapter 4, FEAST is used to examine a fratricide incident that occurred during a simulator-based battle group training exercise. The analysis examines the performance of two teams, one which completed the training mission successfully and one which was involved in a fratricide incident. Again the analysis presented is both exhaustive and detailed, identifying inappropriate schema, low levels of information dissemination, and a communications masking effect as key factors contributing to the fratricide incident. In closing, Chapter 4, the importance of the communication of mission relevant information in shoot, no-shoot decision making is emphasised. In Chapter 5 the authors focus on the communications masking effect that was unearthed during Chapter 4. Here they examine effective and less effective decision making during a Joint Fires mission training exercise. Interestingly, the analysis demonstrates that less communications between teams led to more effective performance. Rafferty et al conclude that this illustrates the impact of communications masking whereby a high frequency of communications can mask important communications. Chapter 6 examines the performance of two fire support teams undertaking pre-deployment Close Air Support training from a Distributed Situation Awareness (DSA) perspective. The analysis revealed correlations between effective performance and high levels of coordination, information integration and cooperation, and low levels of communication. In addition, key relationships between communication, coordination, and situation awareness were identified. Rafferty et al conclude that coordination acts as a mediating factor between situation awareness and communication.

    The analyses presented in Chapters 4, 5, and 6 are interesting in their own right; however, it is perhaps when the findings are integrated that they become most compelling. Chapter 7 presents a comparison of the analyses from the case studies presented in Chapters 4, 5, and 6, enabling a series of conclusions regarding the causes and characteristics of fratricide incidents to be made. This is another high point of the book. The comparison makes for interesting reading and leads to a series of insightful and important conclusions. Notably, Rafferty et al identify differences between the factors underpinning fratricide incidents involving distributed ‘team of teams’ systems versus those involving small collocated teams. For example, it is concluded that, within small co-located teams high levels of communication and information transfer are required in order to generate accurate situation awareness, whereas with larger, distributed teams more efficient communication and information transfer is required since high levels of information transfer can make it difficult for diverse team members to identify and focus on pertinent information.

    In Chapter 8 a summary of the main findings from the overall body of research is presented, along with a comparison with the wider literature, discussion of key issues, main conclusions, and a series of key areas of future research. Chapter 8 ties the program of research together nicely, and provides some important conclusions. A key message from the research is that greater levels of what are normally deemed to be key team processes are not always beneficial in certain military systems. For example, based on their findings, Rafferty et al argue that additional communications may not always be beneficial and that cooperation can be disruptive. In addition, the importance of coordination, appropriate schema, and DSA is discussed. In closing, Rafferty et al present a set of principles designed to help prevent future friendly fire incidents. Although the principles are generally set at a high level, they will prove useful to those involved in the design of military systems, technologies, and procedures and also to those wishing to investigate ways in which to prevent future incidents.

    Some key features of the book are worth a mention. The use of retrospective incident analysis combined with analyses based on direct observation of fratricide events is commendable and goes beyond what has previously been done in this area (most studies have been retrospective only). The actual versus ideal scenario analyses are both interesting and useful and show clearly how the incidents could have been prevented. Finally, the book is well written and I found the use of simple, easy to read summaries in the case study chapters very useful as a way of presenting the findings from exhaustive analyses. Being picky, one slight criticism is that I found myself wanting more specific recommendations on how to prevent fratricide; however, this is understandable given that the book focuses on military systems generally rather than specific areas. Experimentation testing the effectiveness of some of the recommendations presented would also have enhanced the book; however, this is for others to pursue.

    Overall, The Human Factors of Fratricide makes an important contribution to the Military and Human Factors literature. What I particularly like about it is that there is much to offer researchers and practitioners interested in fratricide, including a new model, a methodology for studying fratricide, and various in depth case study analyses of fratricide incidents. This ensures that readers wishing to better understand the concept will be satisfied, whereas readers wishing to examine the concept and further our understanding of it are also equipped to do so. Similarly, there is enough here to support practitioners in their efforts to prevent fratricide. It provides a one-stop shop for those interested in the subject.

    Whilst working as a researcher in the area of military Human Factors, I dipped a toe in the area of fratricide and was struck by the lack of literature surrounding the concept and the lack of usable theory and methods to support further investigation. With The Human Factors of Fratricide, not only do Rafferty et al fill these gaps, they also advance our understanding of fratricide and equip us with the knowledge required to prevent it.

    The Human Factors of Fratricide can be ordered online through Ashgate at: http:// http://www.ashgate.com/isbn/9780754679745.

    References

    [1] Cooper, P., Coalition Deaths Fewer than in 1991: We Became Stronger While Saddam Became Weaker, www.cnn.com, accessed 25 June 2003.

    [2] Ripley, T., Combatting Friendly Fire, www.ft.com, accessed 23 January 2003.

    [3] Wikipedia, Friendly Fire, accessed 7 January 2013.

    [4] Stanton, N.A., Salmon, P.M., Walker, G., Baber, C., and Jenkins, D.P., Human Factors Methods: A Practical Guide for Engineering and Design, Ashgate, Aldershot, UK, 2005.