Embedding ICT Into The Mobile Land Battlespace

Introduction

Failure to achieve value from investing in information and communication technologies (ICTs) has been an ongoing problem for organisations [1,2]. Benefits remain elusive despite promises of greater efficiency and effectiveness from streamlined processes, automation of core tasks and access to business intelligence for decision-making. Translating the promise of a new ICT into value for an organisation or its individual members is not simply an issue of sophisticated systems design, sound project management or rigorous training. Managing the acceptance of a new ICT takes time, understanding of the world into which the ICT is to be introduced, and appreciation of the risks involved. This paper applies these concerns to the domain of the mobile land battlespace in the context of the Australian Defence Force (ADF).

Warfare, by its very nature, involves the deployment of resources that are moved through the battlespace. Attention is now being drawn to the ‘mobile’ aspect of the battlespace because of the introduction of ICT systems across a wider range of vehicle platforms, and greater use by dismounted forces, resulting in increased connectivity and information flow. In the Australian context, battle management and associated communications systems will not only be found in combat vehicles but also in field vehicles and associated modules [3].

In a technological context, mobility has two sides. It denotes computer-based support for people on the move. It also indicates use of mobile technologies such as BlackBerries or iPads, even while located at one’s usual, stationary work place. Bringing these together, mobility encompasses access to technology that is:

• mobile, or capable of being, mobile, and
• stationary or fixed and available to people on the move [4].

Modern land combat and field vehicles are increasingly being equipped with sophisticated ICT systems that enable their occupants to receive data, analyse it and make decisions based on these analyses. This decision making is augmented by mobile technologies that can be employed by personnel following dismount and which support the collection of further contextual information. These combat and field vehicles thus encompass the two aspects of technological mobility described above: they enable a mobile land battlespace.

These mobile combat and field vehicles, when combined with ICT for individual personnel, offer huge potential for the ADF. The challenge is to translate this potential into value for the ADF and its individual members. The research question investigated in this paper is “How can we improve the acceptance of new ICTs in the mobile land battlespace?”

We address this question by drawing on two theoretical frameworks: technology appropriation and technology portfolios. Technology appropriation describes the journey from first encounters with a new ICT through to persistent use, which is a necessary condition for deriving ongoing organisational value [5]. Technology appropriation captures the different influences on users’ acceptance or rejection of a new ICT at different phases in the appropriation process [6–8]. It helps to identify opportunities for intervention to improve outcomes and prevent rejection of the new ICT, highlighting the need for targeted training, support and change management strategies for the different phases [7,9].

The concept of a technology portfolio describes the collections of technologies employed by users. It surfaces the need to consider existing resources (technologies and practices) when implementing a new ICT. It highlights the importance of how a new ICT is presented to users, and the development of training and management strategies that facilitate effective incorporation with existing technologies and practices.

The paper is organized as follows. Background issues affecting the embedding of ICTs into the mobile land battlespace are outlined; these cover organisational goals for implementing ICT systems and the individual’s acceptance of technology. Next, the two theoretical frameworks are outlined. The context for our examination of the mobile battlespace, the ADF, is described. Finally, the implications of these theoretical frameworks for the mobile land battlespace are detailed in a set of guidelines for effectively embedding ICTs in combat and field vehicles.

Background

Organisational goals

ICT systems are selected and implemented by organisations to achieve some goal or outcome. In other words, technology design and implementation are goal-directed activities that include identifying a problem, generating possible solutions and selecting a particular ICT system to resolve the problem [10]. The selected solution should fit with the aims, culture and values of the organisation or its top-level management. Organisations purchase ICT systems with the intention that their use will lead to particular outcomes. In the ADF, the rationale is to deliver on the aspirations associated with Network Centric Warfare (NCW), which in turn is driven by a desire to enhance flexibility and adaptability [11]. However, it has long been observed that there is not a linear path from purchasers’ intentions to implementation and organisational benefits [1,12].

Although driven by organisational goals, the design and development of an ICT system is a social process where negotiations between stakeholders influence the functionality and form of a developed system [13]. The design of the material aspects of an ICT will afford and constrain use, both in the types of activities that users may undertake and the situations in which the technology may be used [9,14]. However, designers’ or developers’ intentions may not be achieved [1] because:

• Those intentions were inadequately expressed in the system. The ICT may not allow easy access to key functionality or it may lack required functionality so that users cannot achieve the intended outcomes.
• Decision makers have failed to select an appropriate ICT to meet their organisational goals. As a result, users may use a new system as intended but the outcomes may not be as intended.
• Different organisations may implement and frame the same ICT in different ways: an enterprise-wide system may be introduced with the rationale of integrating diverse systems, achieving ‘best practice’ processes or providing the most up-to-date technical solution. This rationale will influence the way individual organisational members view the system and so shapes their use of it [1]. This relates to the acceptance of technology, described in the next section.

Individual acceptance of ICT

The relationship between users and technology is complex and multi-layered. New ICT are designed to afford and constrain use. For example, a vehicle mounted Battle Management System is designed to support command and control on the move. However, it may constrain users by providing a smaller screen then they employ back in barracks or at headquarters, or by not providing an easy way to enter textual information. Users adapt to these affordances and constraints: they change their activities to capitalize on the technology’s capabilities. Users of a touch screen BMS who struggled to perform information entry tasks under a high motion condition adapted their reaching strategies to provide greater stability for their fingers, such as through holding onto the sides of the display [15]. This relationship between technology and use, however, is not one-way. Users do not necessarily use a new technology as it was intended by its designers [12, 17] but adapt it to their particular needs, activities and situations. They may employ the new system in ways that diverge from intentions; the interpretive flexibility of the system allows for differing interpretations of the system’s purposes and functionality and so unintended outcomes are likely [13]. Divergence from designers’ intentions is potentially exacerbated where defence forces acquire systems originally designed for another military force.

A technology’s material properties can be adapted by users; this has been called malleability or plasticity [16]. Therefore, the relationship between users and technology is reciprocal: technology enables new activities in new situations and, depending on its interpretive flexibility and malleability, may be adapted in unintended ways for new activities and situations. Technology shapes, and is shaped by, people in use [17]. As a result, ICT-related change may not occur as expected but rather “it is often realised through the ongoing variations which emerge frequently, even imperceptibly, in the slippages and improvisations of everyday activity” [17:88]. This reciprocal change process is described as technology appropriation [6,12,14] and explains why the outcomes of implementing a new ICT may differ from those intended by its designers and the organisation that purchased it.

Individuals may be influenced by the organisational aims and rationale alongside personal aims and perceptions of personal value: ‘what’s in it for me?’ In addition, user adoption and acceptance of ICT will often be influenced by perceived system usefulness, system usability, facilitating conditions, such as training and top management support, computer experience and future use intentions [18]. However powerful the motivation to adopt and accept the new ICT, benefits will not accrue until the ICT is integrated into users’ practices. The individual level is important because it is the basis for group and organisation-level activities. Two theoretical frameworks that assist in understanding the challenges of embedding new ICTs at the individual level are outlined in the following section.

Theoretical frameworks

Technology appropriation

We have labelled the process from encountering a new ICT to integrating it into everyday work practices as ‘technology appropriation’ that is “the way that users evaluate and adopt, adapt and integrate a technology into their everyday lives” [6]. Technology appropriation starts with users learning about the capabilities of the ICT, its potential for providing organisational and personal benefits, and the organisation’s rationale for its introduction. Technology appropriation includes the need to explore the new ICT and evaluate what it does and how. Users will evaluate the ICT’s functionality and capabilities in action and trial likely changes in processes and practices arising from the affordances and constraints of the ICT [14]. Once the ICT is embedded in work practices then ongoing benefits may accrue. Throughout this process, there is the possibility that users will reject the ICT or aspects of it. Thus, new ICT systems are not simply implemented into a work place. There may be a significant time lag between ICT implementation and its integration into users’ practices [8,10].

This process is represented in the Model of Technology Appropriation (MTA) shown in Figure 1. The MTA is a generic model that can be populated with influences on a particular user cohort’s appropriation of a specific ICT [6,9]. For example, it has been applied to understanding the appropriation of an electronic documentation management system employed in the ADF [8]. The MTA depicts the transformation of a Technology as Provided into Technology in Use.

Technology as Provided refers to ‘out of the box’ devices, packaged software or custom-built information systems as they are provided to a user. It has features, capabilities and an underlying theory of use that offer a range of possibilities to users. The features are built in during the design process; the capabilities reflect the malleability of the ICT (the degree to which the ICT can be shaped by the user); and the underlying theory of use reflects designers’ beliefs about the role of technology in human activity and include rules about the behaviour of users such as the expected activities, resources and norms [12,17]. An organisation buying an ICT is also buying this underlying theory. Users adapt to this embodied theory, often changing their practices and situations of use to fit in with the technology in both intended and unintended ways. Also, users may not adhere strictly to this theory and may employ the ICT in unexpected ways.

At Level 1 of the MTA, initial evaluation of the Technology as Provided is made without any prolonged use of the technology. The individual decides whether to adopt it; this decision may include the selection of, or commitment to, buy or use a technology [19]. Alternatively, where use is voluntary, an individual may decide not to adopt. Influences on the adoption decision have been widely studied [15]. Previous studies of ADF ICT systems have identified system usability, usefulness, and prior technology appropriations as influences [20], where prior appropriations are users’ previous experiences with and patterns of use of the same or similar technologies.

At Level 2, users evaluate the technology as they use it: they will explore, adapt and adapt to it. The capabilities of the technology will afford and constrain users’ activities, allowing them to perform some activities while making others difficult or impossible. Thus, users’ activities are shaped by the technology. In addition, depending on the malleability of the technology, users may configure or personalise it. They may also apply their creativity and use it for new purposes or combine it with other resources in unexpected ways to suit their needs. Thus, they will fit the technology to their personal work requirements and use context. Influences on adaptive use of technologies include perceived usefulness, the innovativeness of individuals, and contextual influences such as the time to explore the technology [20,21]. During Level 2 evaluation, some users will reject or disappropriate the technology perhaps because the system affords little advantage over extant technologies and practices.

Level 3 is achieved as, over time, the technology is stabilised so that few adaptations are made to it or to users’ practices. The technology is integrated into users’ work activities and use is persistent. Such use is reinforced by a number of influences, such as habitual behaviour and perceived usefulness. Discrepant events such as the introduction of a new technology may disrupt routines and lead to re-evaluation and disappropriation of the ICT. For example, personal data assistants, such as Palm Pilots, were used extensively by ADF personnel up until a few years ago but have now been disappropriated in favour of Smartphones and tablets. Similarly, the decisions to adopt or not, and to appropriate or disappropriate the technology are conditional and may be re-evaluated at a later time, as shown by the dotted lines in Figure 1.

The stabilised technology is called Technology in Use. Figure 1 shows multiple Technologies in Use, reflecting the possibility that a user may experience stabilisation of a particular ICT multiple times. Consider e-mail for example: most users will have stabilised their technology and practices multiple times over the years as needs and the work context change [16].

We have explored the appropriation of technologies including mobile technologies [4,6] and enterprise-wide systems [7,8,14] in public and private sector, education and defence contexts. This cumulative body of work has detailed the ways in which different groups of users select, explore and modify aspects of a technology according to their needs in particular contexts of use.

It is clear from this description that the process of technology appropriation takes time and the outcomes are not easily predicted. Evaluations of project success may be misleading: inability to perceive benefits in the short-term is normal and expected if one understands the dynamics of the process of technology appropriation.

Our research findings indicate the need for careful management and support throughout the appropriation process. Premature closing down of exploration—common where low-level procedures are mandated—may mean that key functions, features or capabilities remain undiscovered [10]. Ongoing support beyond the initial training helps maintain exploration and so increase the effectiveness of use [7].

We have noted that organisational goals are often insufficient motivation for individual users to embrace a new ICT and change their practices. Individual users must expend energy and time changing practices; this is especially difficult when users do not perceive personal benefits from such changes. Rejection may occur because the ICT or system undermines performance, especially in the short-term. An example is an implementation of an electronic document management system (EDMS) in the ADF [8]. Effective operation of the system required that users entered detailed data about a document. There were few benefits to the individual user from the additional work entering these details: the benefits accrued at the organisational rather than the individual level. As a result, required data fields were ignored or nonsense data were entered. ‘What’s in it for me?’ encapsulates the concerns of the individual. Change management research recognises the importance of individual values and goals in framing and achieving change [22].

Technology portfolios

Most users are familiar with a range of ICT systems, they have amassed a suite of technologies and built work practices to effectively apply them both sequentially and in combination [23]. They have pre-conceived notions around what is necessary and what ‘works’ in their work space. The relationship between new ICT and these existing technologies and practices needs to be negotiated and worked out over time. For this we draw on the concept of a technology portfolio [4]. A technology portfolio applies portfolio theory to an individual’s selections and uses of multiple ICT systems.

The concept of a portfolio is widely used in finance and investment. The aim of a portfolio approach is diversification, where risk is spread over a number of options and the weaknesses (high risks) in one area of the portfolio can be offset by strengths (low risks) in other areas [24]. The investor then concentrates on the overall performance of the portfolio and views each individual investment as a part of the whole portfolio. Portfolio theory has been applied to examine the ways that individuals manage their selections and uses of multiple technologies [4]. A technology portfolio is constructed to meet the needs of a particular user. It contains a diverse mixture of technologies, both electronic and non-electronic, that can be ‘mixed and matched’ to maximize the overall value gained from technologies.

The availability of a new ICT will lead to its evaluation in relation to existing technologies within a user’s portfolio and associated work practices. In most cases these existing technologies and practices will not be immediately replaced by the new ICT. Rather, there will be a substantial period during which both old and new exist. Over time, less useful technologies and practices may be discarded although significant redundancies occur in people’s technology portfolios.

The concept of a technology portfolio is extended at the group or organisational level by work on technology interdependence [25]. This examines sequential relationships between technologies in work processes and the ways that gaps between such technologies are mitigated by workers. The concept has particular relevance to the mobile battlespace where work is team-based and both collections and interdependencies of technologies are evident, as described in the next section.

The ADF

The ADF is making substantial investments in ICT to achieve a networked land force that links personnel, their commanders, sensors and weapon systems [26]. For example, Project LAND 75 Phase 3.4 will deliver a Battle Management System (BMS) that will be vehicle mounted. When combined with the combat radio system being acquired under Project JP2072 Phase 1, the BMS will provide personnel and their commanders with increased information [3]. The ADF is also investing in a range of new field and combat land vehicle systems that will provide improved protection and mobility. LAND 121 is the project acquiring field vehicles, trailers and modules, and Project LAND 400 will acquire the Land Combat Vehicle System (LCVS) [3]. Vehicle crews, and dismounted forces delivered via these vehicles, will also be provided with enhanced combat ensembles via project LAND 125, as well as radio and BMS systems via LAND75 and JP2072.

The technologies acquired under the above projects will be an important input to achieving enhanced flexibility and adaptability in the mobile land battlespace. However, the generation of military capability will also require the effective appropriation of these technologies by users. Effective appropriation cannot be taken for granted. The ADF is no different from organisations in general in struggling at times to generate benefits from its investments in ICT [1,8]. The Australian Tactical Command System, which was the pre-cursor to the Battlefield Command Support System (BCSS), is but one example of an ICT that was not successfully implemented [27]. Its replacement, BCSS, was heralded as a successful replacement [27], however a later evaluation of the system revealed that one component critical to field use, the Command Data Network System, was viewed by users as being unreliable, unintuitive, and requiring more development work to meet users’ needs, but it was seen as having potential [8]. From an appropriation perspective, level 2 evaluations had begun to occur but they were generally negative, which suggested disappropriation would occur. CDNS was later removed from BCSS [8].

When CDNS was evaluated in the field it became clear that personnel preferred to use paper-based maps. They reported that they would employ both digital and paper-based maps since the former did not readily support briefings and collective planning, nor was it seen to be robust, but they recognised its value in supporting shared situational awareness. More recent work in support of requirements development for LAND 121 vehicles also shows the likely prevalence of technology portfolios in the future land vehicle domain. Users wanted storage spaces that would accommodate maps, notebooks, their Smartphones, iPods and other personal digital devices.

Implications

As part of the shift towards supplying more ICTs in the cabins of combat and field vehicles, we need to come to grips with the consequences of how individual users are likely to interact with the ICTs and how this process can be managed to integrate them into military practices to maximise positive outcomes. The two theoretical frameworks, the MTA and technology portfolios, are combined to examine the challenges of embedding new ICTs in the mobile land battlespace.

The MTA presents the process of exploration and mutual adaptation undertaken by individuals after their first encounters with a new ICT. It details the time needed for an individual user to integrate a new ICT into work practices. It also highlights the need for targeted support and management strategies to assist users in adapting, and adapting to, the new ICT to achieve effective and persistent use. The MTA pictures the uncertainty of outcomes of implementing new ICTs and the risk that the ICT will be rejected or only partially appropriated.

The MTA describes the appropriation of a single technology. This is extended through the metaphor of a technology portfolio that emphasises the importance of familiar and well-tried technologies and the work practices that have been constructed to derive value from these technologies. Thus, a user will not only appropriate a new ICT on its own merits but also as a potential addition to this portfolio of technologies.

Some guidelines for managing the introduction of new ICTs into the mobile land battlespace arise from applying these two theoretical frameworks.

• There are likely to be mismatches between the organisational goals for selecting new technologies, their design and the needs of individual personnel on combat and land vehicles. The affordances and constraints of a new ICT may lead to frustration as personnel go about their work. Users’ initial encounters (Level 1) and exploration (Level 2) of new ICTs generate changing needs for support by trainers and managers to overcome user resistance and possible rejection. Thus, there are ongoing requirements for intervention to assist productive appropriation activities.
• The model of technology appropriation posits that different patterns of use will arise from individuals’ explorations and adaptations of the provided ICTs. As users undertake new activities in different situations of use, they will perceive new possibilities for technological support; these will necessitate modification of the ICTs. Unexpected but productive adaptations should be captured and communicated to other users to improve the benefits gained by coworkers or other defence forces. Unexpected but potentially negative changes (such as workarounds that circumvent safety procedures) need to be identified, managed and discontinued.
• This process of technology appropriation extends beyond the new ICT. Accepting the new ICT and integrating it into work practices requires evaluation at two levels. Firstly, users evaluate a new ICT on its own merits. Secondly, they evaluate it through its relationship with existing work practices and technologies. Individual users build a technology portfolio or an integrated collection of resources that they draw on for particular activities or purposes. It is likely that the new ICT will not replace any existing technologies in a technology portfolio in the short-term [4]. Rather, we have observed that a new ICT will be added to the technology portfolio and its relationship with existing resources is negotiated and evaluated over time. For example, we should not anticipate the immediate substitution of paper maps by digital mapping tools. One consequence of having a technology portfolio is that when difficulties are encountered with the new ICT, users may revert to previous technologies in their portfolios; these ‘reversionary modes’ pose particular threats to acceptance of the new ICT because repeated reversion increases the time lag between introduction and integration or may even lead to rejection of the new ICT.
• The process of appropriation of a new ICT and negotiating its place within an individual’s technology portfolio highlight the time needed to derive value from new technologies. Our research has indicated that integration may take many months (for example, depending on the complexity of the new ICT, its similarity to well-known ICTs, the embeddedness of existing technologies, perceptions of its benefits to individual users, and the types of support provided to achieve change). Thus, there may be a significant time lag between providing a new ICT and its acceptance. Persistence with the new ICT at both the organisational and individual levels and ongoing support for individual users may assist in ensuring that the ICT is accepted not rejected and that it is used in ways that meet the defence forces’ goals.
• Integration (Level 3) may not be permanent. We have noted that a stabilised ICT may be subject to further exploration and adaptation in response to external triggers (for example, sharing practices with peers, activities in new contexts or with different collaborators, curiosity or creativity) [14]. Managing and communicating the outcomes of these subsequent explorations to personnel may assist in further embedding ICT innovations in the mobile land battlespace. This reinforces the need for ongoing monitoring, change management, training and support that lasts well beyond the initial implementation period.

Conclusion

As part of the shift towards supplying more ICT in the cabins of combat and field vehicles, we need to come to grips with the consequences of how individual users are likely to interact with the ICTs and the time required to integrate them into everyday practices. These technologies are not being introduced into organisations with no prior ICT experience. Rather, the military are familiar with a range of ICT systems, they have amassed a suite of technologies and built work practices to effectively apply them. They have pre-conceived notions around what is necessary and what ‘works’ in their work space.

Problems in embedding ICTs into the mobile land battlespace have been addressed through the application of two empirically-grounded theoretical frameworks. Technology appropriation, in contrast to many theories of user acceptance, includes the process from pre-adoption through adoption to persistent use; empirical work has shown the differing influences on users’ evaluations at different times of this process [6,14]. We extended work on technology appropriation beyond a single technology through the concept of technology portfolios.

Application of these theoretical frameworks has led to development of the five guidelines outlined in the previous section. Effective application of these guidelines depends on skilful management of the technology appropriation process. This includes careful observation of users’ appropriation efforts, understanding of the changing time horizons for users’ evaluations and consequently for interventions to assist in productive efforts, and provision of appropriate training and support throughout this time.

References

Authors

Jennie Carroll is Associate Professor of Project Management at RMIT University, Melbourne. She gained her PhD on requirements engineering in 2002. Jennie’s research is focused on how people derive value from their use of digital technologies. Along with industry, colleagues and students, she has been researching technology appropriation for 12 years. She can be contacted at jennie.carroll@rmit.edu.au.

Corresponding Author: Justin Fidock is a Senior Cognitive Scientist at the Defence Science and Technology Organisation, Australian Department of Defence. He gained his PhD on understanding information technology appropriation in organisations in 2011 from RMIT University. He has a Masters in Organisational Psychology from the University of South Australia, and is a registered psychologist and member of the College of Organisational Psychologists. Justin’s other research interests include technology evaluation, human systems integration, and organisational change. He can be contacted at justin.fidock@dsto.defence.gov.au, +618 7389 6788 (phone), and +618 7389 5055 (fax).