Paul J. Hazell
A numerical study using the explicit non-linear transient dynamic finite difference code AUTODYN-2D has been undertaken to examine the effect of a rear plate from an explosive reactive armour (ERA) impacting lightweight armoured vehicle hulls at normal incidence. Four thicknesses of ERA plate impacting high hardness steel armour and an aluminium alloy (7039) armour were simulated. The deformation of the vehicle hull and the measured strains are reported indicating critical areas around the fixings and the central region of impact.
Paul L. Arcus
As many armies worldwide aim to become well-equipped forces available for operations at short notice, the attractiveness of a networked wireless command support system (CSS) grows. The Australian Army’s Battlefield Command Support System (BCSS) is one example of a system that seems ideally suited for wireless connectivity and its associated advantages. Cabled deployments of command support systems in headquarters (HQ) have several disadvantages due to the physical properties of the cables and the transmission media. Compared to fibre-cabled systems, wireless networking offers reduced set-up and strip-down times. Wireless systems also support the ad-hoc nature of field network deployments and do not require sustained effort towards architecture planning prior to deployment. Several candidate wireless technologies for use in a networked command support system are currently in commercial and domestic use but care must be exercised to ensure that these commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) solutions meet the requirements for Army field use. This paper examines the advantages and disadvantages of cabled networks. Several current and future wireless systems are reviewed and some predictions are made for the future of wireless systems in networks for command support systems.
Alfred Kaufman
This paper argues that advocates of Network Centric Warfare are not fully responsive to the strategic changes that have occurred in recent years and suggests two ways in which their efforts should be correspondingly modified. The first suggestion asks for special focus on what components one would like to network and recommends inclusion of systems complementary to what we employ today; the second, recommends that networking be enlarged to include, beyond connection of hardware elements, a “bringing together in a coordinated manner” of complementary concepts of operation and perhaps even complementary strategies. These complementary systems, concepts of operation, and strategies, when used in conjunction with current systems, concepts of operation, and strategies, would significantly reduce an enemy’s ability to exploit the singular vulnerabilities that characterize any capability and would thereby consolidate the Alliance’s capability to handle the asymmetric threats that have replaced the symmetric threat of the Cold War.
Neville F. Parker, Marie Henderson and Charles R. Moore
Military operations are increasingly being conducted by ad hoc coalitions. The need to provide a communications and information system (CIS) infrastructure for coalition members with connections to the command support systems of contingent members, particularly that of the lead nation, poses difficult information security issues. This paper discusses the heightened need to support need-to-know separation within a coalition environment compared with a single nation tactical deployment. Security architecture options for a coalition CIS are discussed and the enhancement of these architectures with Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) per-message confidentiality services is proposed. The integration of PKI technology within a coalition deployment is explored, as is the extension of the confidentiality services offered by this technology to agencies external to the coalition deployment via public and rear-link networks.
Mark A. Richardson
This paper is the second in a series of short tutorial articles loosely based on tutorial sessions given at the Royal Military College of Science to Masters of Science (MSc) students who are studying on defence technology courses. The purpose of the tutorials is to enable students to do first-pass (rough) calculations on various aspects of electro-optical systems. This type of analysis is typical of that which they may carry out in their potential future role as defence analysts. This second paper looks at calculating the power received at a detector from a target that may be considered to be either a point source or an extended source. Such calculations enable the estimation of, for example, the lock-on range of an infrared (IR) homing missile.
Sean Price and Philip John
Systems approaches inevitably rely heavily on models to develop understanding and aid communication and decisions. In systems engineering (SE) these system considerations and modelling lead directly to a design for a purposeful system or process that is implemented in the real world. In the past SE has been associated with hard, well bounded, precedented problems. This paper considers the changing nature of modern systems and their implications on the practice of SE, with particular focus on the role of models in the engineering of complex systems and capabilities. The paper also discusses the status of models at the various stages of the systems life cycle, their enduring nature, the fulfilment of stakeholder expectations and the relationship between soft and hard systems methodologies in SE. Finally, the paper highlights the applicability of systems methods that would not be seen as part of a traditional SE approach.
Grant T. Hammond, The Mind of War: John Boyd and American Security, Smithsonian Institution Press, Washington, 2001. Reviewed by David Goyne
Reviewed by David Goyne
