Be Careful What You Wish For: The Dangers of Fighting with a Network Centric Military

Introduction

The day when computers were networked was a very important day in the history of modern man. No doubt, networking will affect society in many significant ways, much as the commercial Internet has already profoundly modified both the economy as well as our personal lives. An extension of this technology to the realm of military operations is therefore an undertaking well worth concentrated consideration.

As is often the case, however, novelty tends to become fashion, and exaggerated hopes for the future dominate the early days in the life of any new technology. Network Centric Warfare, which describes the fundamental transformation that networking of military systems would, according to its proponents, bring to the way we fight a war, is no exception. After reading the basic writings that define Network Centric Warfare, one cannot easily avoid the powerfully tempting vision of a completely integrated, information-driven network of military systems inexorably crushing the enemy’s will.

However, this vision is accompanied by an equally unavoidable feeling that the whole idea of a fully networked force might, in the end, make little operational sense. This paper is intended to explore the reasons for this natural discomfort one experiences when confronted with the claims put forth by the proponents of Network Centric Warfare. Therefore, we shall be concerned, not so much with information technology per se, as with understanding the network-centric concept of warfare that appears to be guiding the effort to introduce that technology into the military structure. Specifically, we want to know whether a nation would be well served by a network-centred military such as the one described by its proponents.

The economic pedigree of network centric warfare

It is well known that the proponents of Network Centric Warfare claim its legitimacy from events that have recently taken place in the world economy. On the face of it, the military establishment’s desire to take the economic establishment as its model must strike one as quite bizarre. For, while it is true that violence can often be found in the market place, the free market and the battlefield are two distinct entities. The economy aims at producing wealth through a free market; war aims at destroying wealth through violent action. The economy operates within the confines of societal rules; in war, there are no rules to hamper a nation’s warlike spirit. A beaten economic competitor usually stays beaten, while a defeated nation will inevitably live on to fight another day. More importantly, however, for our argument here, war displays a significantly less graceful reaction to human error than does the free market; making the wrong decision in war is more likely to be catastrophic to society than making the wrong decision in the market.

The notion that war is business is not a mere figure of speech for the proponents of Network Centric Warfare; the idea impregnates much of their writings. To quote but one of the many examples that populate the field, David Alberts [1] says in his book that

… military operations should be designed to accomplish a task or solve a problem.

In other words, the purpose of warfare is problem solving. By contrast, Clausewitz [2] says

… the aim of warfare is to disarm the enemy so as to make him comply to our will.

Note how the hostility-based determination to submit the enemy to our will has given way to the more neutral concept of problem solving.

Clausewitz cautioned us against this peacetime tendency to think about the bloodshed of war in more philanthropic, or in this case more business-like, terms:

He who uses force unsparingly, without reference to the bloodshed involved, must obtain a superiority if his adversary uses less vigour in its application. This is the way in which the matter must be viewed and it is to no purpose, it is even against one’s interest, to turn away from the consideration of the real nature of the affair because the horror of its elements excite repugnance.

In any event, even if one were to accept the proposition that war is business, the lessons learned by the proponents from what is happening in the market place today are demonstrably incorrect. Thus, it is suggested that Economy B, as the proponents call the information-driven sector of our economy, is a truly new form of economic activity exhibiting new forms of behaviour. To quote from VADM. Cebrowski’s seminal paper published in the January 1998 issue of the Proceedings [3],

Economy A is characterized by stability, market share equilibrium, and decreasing return on investment. Economy B is characterized by extraordinary growth and wealth generation, increasing returns on investment, the absence of market share equilibrium, and the emergence of mechanisms for product lock-in.

While all these observations were indeed true just a year ago, they do not herald a new economy in which,

… the laws of supply and demand that govern economy A have been turned on their head.

Rather, they represent no more than special features characterizing periods of fundamental innovation that routinely occur in the economy.

The overarching concern in such an innovation phase of the economy is not the immediate generation of wealth but the successful establishment of the innovation. To accomplish that, inventors of alternative forms of implementing the innovation would lower prices to addict the consumer to their own version of the innovation and thus lock-out the other alternatives. However, since society cannot live on the edge of fundamental change forever, this phase must come to an end. Once the new technology is in, and fundamental innovation stops, the old economy with all the familiar rules of behaviour returns. The victorious inventor becomes the pusher for a society already addicted to his products and prices will grow again as dictated by the law of supply and demand. It appears, therefore, that Network Centric Warfare proponents would permanently implement in the military what is merely transitional behaviour in the economy.

Network centrism

Imagining that it was born of a revolution in economic affairs, Network Centric Warfare thinks of itself as a revolution in military affairs. Needless to say, it is no more a revolution in military affairs than the economic changes above were a revolution in economic affairs. It only appears to be so because it would, if implemented, come on the heels of a protracted period of unchanged military strategy and tactics. Current lack of exciting developments in military art, however, is not the consequence of the old technology and therefore it is unlikely that it will be overcome by any new technology.

This transcendental tendency of proponents of Network Centric Warfare to jump over reality by overstating their case, is typical of movements with a mission. Network Centric Warfare appears therefore to be a new ideology masquerading in the garb of a new technology. Like all other –isms that preceded it, Network Centrism begins by ignoring the true nature of the human character. Although Clausewitz constantly reminds that war is driven by human hostilities, the authors of Network Centrism seem to think that new weapon systems and new information technologies can, all by themselves, fundamentally change the way humans fight their wars. In fact, Clausewitz’s work depends only marginally on the nature of the weapons used in his own time and rests fundamentally on a study of the character of man. To quote a pertinent passage [2],

Theory must take into account the human element; it must accord a place to courage, boldness, even rashness. The Art of War has to deal with living and with moral forces, the consequences of which is that it can never attain to the absolute and positive. Courage and self-reliance are principles quite essential to War; consequently, theory must only set up such rules as allow ample scope for all degrees and varieties of these necessary and noblest of military virtues.

One of the examples Network-Centrists like to recount is Admiral Clemmins’ recent use of e-mail to revolutionize communications in the Straits of Taiwan. One wonders, however, what would have happened to Clemmins’ well-laid plans had a real enemy possessed the rashness, to use Clausewitz’ word, to interfere with the operation by throwing a virus or two into the network? Let us remember that Soviet communism has ultimately failed, not so much because of our containment strategy, but because human character stubbornly interfered with Lenin’s well laid plans.

Indeed, the idea, often expressed in the network-centric literature that we should [3],

… try to achieve one hundred percent content and accuracy with zero time delay,

only carries the disregard for reality beyond the specific disregard for human character discussed above. The belief in the absolute perfectibility of things expressed in the previous quotation has the alluring sound of all –isms that populate the grave yard of history; it does violence to reality by subjugating it to an utopian vision from the vantage point of which all natural limits become mere obstacles to be overcome by diligence, determination, and, if need be, by force. Thus, the proponents clearly recognize that current warfighters do not live up to their vision when they say [3]:

The war fighter who does not understand the source of his combat power in such things as CEC, Global Command and Control, and Link-16, simply is worth less than those who do.

But they are unwilling to consider the possibility that not enough humans can understand these things to make-up a military force; instead, they continue the thought by saying:

The Services must both mainstream and merge those with technical skills and those with operational experience to create the new operators.

History shows that new men are never created, they just happen to occur from time to time.

To see what awaits such a disposition for creating new men, compare the utopian vision of the French Revolution, the grandfather of all subsequent –isms, to the realistic recognition of natural limits by the writers of the American Constitution. The latter have produced a document that comfortably guided a nation of real people towards a prosperous future, while the former required the guillotine to implement its vision of a new man.

The other feature Network Centrism shares with all ideologies is the need it feels to develop a new language. Network Centric speak is everywhere. We speak of competition to describe a bloody war, of competition space to describe the battlefield. We talk of things such as ecosystems, infostructures, self-synchronization, thin clients, logic bombs, actors, and we dispose of our enemies whenever we want to kill them. Apparently a new lingo strengthens the impression that we are on the verge of something truly new, something that requires a creative extension of our current capacity to communicate.

The point is that new technology should not be introduced by way of absolute dicta intended to proscribe the way we fight, but by means of a free market of ideas and opposing factions that ultimately will shape the way we fight, a market in which what is real is allowed to win over what is utopian.

The exaggerated claims of network centrism

A person unconcerned with the warnings of history would find the previous section of very little import; he would insist that he is about the nation’s business and will dedicate his attention to implementing rather than talking about his vision. To satisfy his legitimate concerns, we must proceed beyond generalities to examine the basic idea on its own specific claims.

Among these claims, the most important appears to be the proposition that networking translates into information superiority. This claim fails on at least two different points: it overestimates man’s capacity to deal with contradictory information and it underestimates the enemy’s ability for mischief. As to the first point, listen to Clausewitz again [2]:

Great part of the information obtained in war is contradictory, a still greater part is false, and by far the greatest part is of doubtful character. Most reports are false, and the timidity of men acts as a multiplier of lies and untruth. As a general rule, every one is most inclined to lend credence to the bad than to the good. Every one is inclined to magnify the bad in some measure, and although the alarms which are thus propagated like the waves of the sea subside into themselves, still, like them, without any apparent cause they rise again. Firm in reliance on his own better convictions, the Chief must stand like a rock against which the sea breaks its fury in vain.

Clearly, no amount of networking of information will change the import of Clausewitz’ observation because he talks about men’s natural reaction to information, not about information itself. Moreover, as the passage quoted above indicates, the whole hinges on the Chief and his ability to steadfastly follow his vision against the frailties of his men. Modern technology will not help the military establishment to create any more Chiefs than it has ever been able to create in the past.

Concerning the second point, the proposition that networking translates into information superiority is manifestly true only if the enemy passively lays himself out to be observed. The proponents of Network Centric Warfare clearly tend to believe the enemy would do exactly that. Specifically, there seems to be a cockroach-exterminator model of warfare pervading network-centric thinking. The enemy is a target endowed only with enough individuality to seek for ways of hiding himself from the all-seeing eye of the network. But, sooner or later, try as he may to hide, we shall find and exterminate him.

Network Centrism carries the passivity of its assumed enemy to its ultimate conclusion: it telescopes all war down to strike. Listen to this description from Albert’s book [1]:

First, the target must be detected. Second, it must be identified. Third the decision to engage the target must be made. Fourth, the decision must be conveyed to the weapon. Fifth, the weapon must be aimed and fired.

Network Centrism, therefore, does not see us getting involved into a truly two-sided position warfare full of surprising moves by the enemy, as described in the tales of glory told in books of military history, but rather it envisions us standing off at some safe distance and destroying largely helpless enemy forces at will. This more than anything else, is perhaps at the root of our immediate fascination with Network Centric Warfare.

Unfortunately, strikes can easily be defeated by creatively hiding from the attacker’s eye, as the large and ever growing population of cockroaches tends to suggest. Moreover, history has shown that successful strike operations are not automatically followed by successful war outcomes. If Hitler’s war machine would not have disintegrated from within for lack of credible central command, the strategic bombing raids of World War II would not have defeated the Germans; Saddam Hussein still rules in Iraq despite the repeated strikes levied at his infrastructure; the Strike Operations in Kosovo have done little to destroy the Serb Army, and the Northern Alliance had probably more to do with the collapse of the Taliban than our strike operations. One should not underestimate the power of an enemy that resorts to deception or to passive resistance.

Thus reduced to strike warfare, Network Centrism is doomed to die between the proverbial rock and a hard place: on the one hand, the enemy hides and refuses to provide foothold for our information strategy while on the other hand CNN and the enormous expenditure involved in conducting strikes over any length of time force the Allies to halt their operations well before achieving desired outcomes. Instead of clarity, Network Centrism may be just as likely to bring about nothing but utter confusion.

The other important claim made by Network Centrism appears to be the proposition that there is much to be gained by dismantling current weapon platforms and embedding the resulting elements into a continuously adapting network-centric ecosystem. This fundamental shift from platform-centric to network-centric warfare, in the words of David Alberts [1],

… translates information superiority into combat power by effectively linking knowledgeable entities in the battle space.

Specifically, Network Centrism aims,

… at decoupling of sensors from weapon platforms and at decoupling weapon platforms from actors. In Network Centric Warfare actors do not inherently own sensors, and decision makers do not inherently own actors. All three types of entities work collaboratively in response to the dynamic of the battle space.

The idea that decision makers would ever relinquish control without an all out fight to the finish is a measure of just how deeply utopian Network Centrism really is.

In any event, by thus concentrating our capabilities into one ecosystem we invite the enemy to accomplish in one blow what might otherwise have required many. The seemingly overwhelming power of the ecosystem should not fool us as to its invincibility. To kill a thousand Philistines, Samson had to wield the jaw bone of an ass a thousand times; once the Philistines had symbolically concentrated all their capability into one, seemingly invincible Goliath, it only took David one well aimed shot to win the entire war.

Implementing network centrism

As the proponents of Network Centrism themselves point out, implementing this shift from platform to network centric warfare requires that we make intellectual, financial, and process changes that will be all but reversible. Once made, these changes will irreversibly set us on a path constrained by the centrality of information superiority to the way we intend to fight. An intrepid enemy can exploit this lack of full flexibility by making sure we do not get the information we need.

In preparing for warfare one should commit to hardware, not approach. Doing the first is both necessary and harmless. It is necessary because development of new hardware takes a very long time; it is harmless because committing to any hardware set does not diminish the enemy’s uncertainty about how we are planning to fight. Committing to approach, however, would significantly reduce enemy uncertainty, allowing them to plan to the specific weaknesses we have introduced when we have openly decided to follow a given course of military action. One cannot but remember the Maginot line and the German panzer attack around it.

If, notwithstanding all of these questions, the ultimate goal of Network Centrism should somehow be fully achieved, and if consequently we have irreversibly moved from the platform centrism of today to the network centrism of tomorrow, our sensors and weapons systems will have become cells in a large, living organism. As such, their independent existence will have slowly atrophied and they will have become vitally dependent on the life-giving information flowing through the embedding organism. Terminate that, and you will no longer have the collection of independently capable weapon platforms to fall back on, but a bunch of dead cells. That, is a recipe for disaster.

References

Author

Dr. Kaufman is a study director at the Institute for Defense Analyses in Washington, DC. Over the years he has worked on all aspects of naval warfare and is currently involved in studies of surface ship manning issues and of capabilities-based acquisition strategies.