Paul J. Hazell and Shane A. Armstrong
An experimental programme was conducted to investigate the mechanics of perforation of the 7.62-mm NATO Ball round through multiple glass array. Two separate experimental trials were conducted using a multiple glass array as a target. In the first experiments, the spacing in between the glass plates and the areal density were varied. In the second trials, the plates had no spacing in-between and the areal density was fixed. Results indicating the nature of the penetration mechanism are presented with specific reference to the formation of the cone of comminuted glass that propagates from the front plate subsequent to its perforation.
Jonathan S. Pape
Mortar weapons have traditionally provided the infantry commander with indirect fire that is immediately available. While the introduction of mechanised forces during the 1960s and 1970s provided the impetus to mount traditional ground-based mortars into armoured personnel carriers, the weapons systems have undergone little further development. Organisational studies to support the recent drive to restructure armies into lighter, more mobile and deployable forces are showing a considerable increase in the quantity of mortars, especially heavy mortar weapon systems, that are being considered for inclusion in light armoured and mechanised infantry units. This paper discusses some of the technical methods that might be employed by designers to provide mortar weapons and ammunition with increased capabilities to meet the firepower needs of these new lighter, but more capable, forces. The paper also discusses other aspects, which will arguably provide a greater improvement, such as the provision of position and pointing information for mortar weapons, accurate target survey information and the integration of mortar weapons into vehicles that have common mobility with the remainder of the force.
William D. Blair
Success on the land battlespace has traditionally been attributed to the leadership and skill of the commander. The introduction of the staff system and limitations of communications tended to isolate the commander from the sources of his information. Paradoxically, the capacity of modern communications and information systems may constrain the commander by overwhelming him with the volume of data. Recently, a concept known as ‘Network-Centric Warfare’ has made claims of being able to speed up command decision making and improve tactical command and control. This concept leans on technology and procedures being developed in the commercial world. At the same time, commercial management has explored a development known as ‘Knowledge Management’. This paper explores Knowledge Management concepts to consider what relevance they might have to Army tactical command and control specifically at formation and unit level. It particularly asks what parallels might exist between Knowledge Management concepts and those of Network-Centric Warfare. The paper argues that Network-Centric Warfare embraces only a sub-set of the concepts enunciated under Knowledge Management.
Alfred I. Kaufman
This paper explores the consequences that might flow from a complete networking of all systems making up a military force. The impact of both the general thought pattern involved in Network Centric Warfare as well as of its specific recommendations upon a nation’s ability to fight a war are discussed. The paper is intended to provide a balance to the often-exaggerated claims made by proponents of Network Centric Warfare concerning the advantages of this way of fighting a war.
Mark A. Richardson
This paper is the first in a series of short tutorial articles loosely based on tutorial sessions given at the Royal Military College of Science to Masters of Science (MSc) students who are studying on defence technology courses. The purpose of the tutorials is to enable students to do first-pass (rough) calculations on various aspects of electro-optical system. This type of analysis is typical of that which they may carry out in their potential future role as defence analysts. This first paper looks at calculating the power requirement of a laser and/or the sensitivity required of the detector for laser-beam riding, laser-warning receivers and laser-designation systems.
Jeremy D. Smith, Peter J. Haysman and Steve J. Szalay
The Strategy to Task Technique (STT) is an approach used to develop low-level, often system-specific, requirements for a system or capability through a process of decomposition. The paper describes the use of STT as an enabling analytical tool to support technology investment decisions. The Strategy to Task technique was used to establish relative priorities for a number of defence system categories. These priorities were then used in a subsequent analysis to evaluate the relative contribution of a number of technology programmes to these defence system categories; the aim was to establish investment priorities for these technology programmes. Two Strategy to Task analyses were completed; one analysis used UK military doctrine material and sources, the other analysis used a UK military task list hierarchy. These analyses produced two independent sets of relative priorities associated with the defence system categories. There was reasonable consistency between these two sets of priorities. Further sensitivity analysis was completed to establish a greater degree of confidence in the outputs. The paper also assesses the method of implementation used and discusses the robustness of the Strategy to Task approach in this application.
E. Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace, Revised and Enlarged Edition, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2001. Reviewed by David Goyne
Reviewed by David Goyne
