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Volume 18, Number 3, November 2015

Break The Stove-Pipe Stranglehold On Capability With An Open Systems Approach

  1. 1 Secure Communication and Information Systems, Thales Australia Limited, Rydalmere, NSW, Australia.

Abstract

Adopting an open systems approach (OSA) during the requirements definition phase of Australian Defence Force (ADF) procurement programs will help break the stove-pipe stranglehold on communication and information system capability. The resulting return on investment will be the delivery of a set of agile capability solutions that are easily enhanced to meet future requirements while at the same time reducing vendor lock-in, risk and support costs. A snapshot of ADF projects are reviewed and we discuss potential strangulation issues regarding ambiguous boundaries and associated risks that could be addressed by an OSA. A brief overview is provided on the OSA initiatives underway by other country’s defence agencies including; UK MOD, US DoD and NATO. We introduce a high level platform concept that could be used as a framework when defining project requirements with an OSA discuss the short and long term benefits that could be achieved. We conclude that an OSA is a future-proofing acquisition strategy that can yield important benefits such as capability gain, more open competition, ability to re-use rather than replace, ultimately reducing waste and lowering costs.

Introduction

It is a fact that when ADF programs run late and over budget there are capability shortfalls and the inevitable strong criticism in the press that discredits the procurement process. There are many reasons for an overrun, however one significant issue is the stove-piped closed nature of programs that makes capability integration difficult to achieve.

Vertically integrated programs in any enterprise including the ADF tend to suffer from tunnel vision and contribute to the formation of stove-piped silos of excellence. It is too easy to lose focus on the future and concentrate on the immediate problems at hand related to capability delivery. This can be avoided by establishing an open systems approach derived from the fundamentals of good system engineering practice as already demonstrated by a number of international defence agencies.

The concept of an open system has come about because of a drive in the commercial and military markets towards standardisation by both technology buyers and technology sellers. From the buyer’s point of view, open systems provide the ability to select from a wider range of interoperable products and solutions - mixing and matching these to best meet the buyer’s overall needs and budgets. From the seller’s point of view, an open systems approach can maximise mutual benefit with other sellers through collaboration in an open competitive market that is focused on meeting the buyer’s needs, thereby providing a greater overall opportunity.

In order to understand the rationale behind the adoption of an OSA, one first needs a clear definition.

Reference [1] provides a welcome insight regarding the specification of open systems to improve system interoperability and flexibility in defence information and technology systems. It proposes a definition of an open system and an open standard and provides a list of very useful resources – in particular the five principle based Modular Open Systems Approach (MOSA) that has been in use by the US DoD since 2004 [2].

A key aspect of being truly “open” requires that there are no barriers to integration by third parties. This concept is often misunderstood especially when vendors make claims about the openness of their solution—which may the case in terms of the technologies used—but offer no means for third party integration.

The key advantages offered by an OSA derived from [1–3] are summarised as:

  • Provides the framework to develop agile, robust, and adaptive systems and integrated architectures needed for assembling a joint, network-centric, and reconfigurable force.
  • Allows vendor independence enabling a “best of breed” selection to maximise capability.
  • Modular elements can be combined for a cohesive purpose, enabling system developers to synthesise a system using an inventory of pre-implemented elements. This allows elements to be swapped out and replaced with other elements of superior capability as required to address rapidly evolving threats and requirements thereby future-proofing the solution.
  • Eliminates vendor lock-in that can otherwise significantly constrain maintenance and upgrade. Vendors will be more motivated to perform knowing they can be easily replaced.
  • Improves system interoperability and flexibility.
  • Reduces development cycle time because systems can be built with “plug and play” building blocks that use open standards interfaces.
  • Reduces total cost of ownership - users can be trained across a range of systems as they are based on open standards and allows the ability to use materiel from multiple competing vendors when cost effective.
  • Allows effective integration and/or retrofit of earlier increments with later increments within an evolutionary acquisition context.
  • Promotes reuse of functional components, which creates commonality and mitigates the risk of obsolescence.

Issues With Australian Land Programs

This section identifies a number of ADF LAND projects that are clearly interrelated and lists some of the potential stove-pipe issues. Reference [1] warns that “the current landscape of information and technology systems in the Australian Defence Force (ADF) consists of many monolithic or stove-piped sub-systems with inefficient and awkward integration into the larger infrastructure. This situation could continue under the ADF’s focus on procuring Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) and Military Off-The-Shelf (MOTS) products, which are often encumbered by proprietary technologies and arms traffic restrictions, resulting in vendor lock-in for through life support.”

Adopting an OSA within the scope of these programs will improve the ability to support and upgrade these systems to meet the evolving requirements of the ADF throughout the capability life cycle - breaking the stove-pipe stranglehold.

A Sample of Relevant Programs

A sample of interconnected ADF LAND programs is illustrated in Figure 1.

Interconnected ADF LAND programs.
Figure 1. Interconnected ADF LAND programs.

A key feature is that these programs have unclear or overlapping boundaries—represented by the overlap and dotted lines in the figure—resulting in unclear responsibilities and requirements. This constitutes a significant integration risk to the ADF and the contractors involved. The result is not only higher cost but also loss of reputation.

LAND 2072 Phase 3 seeks to provide the mobile elements of the battlespace communications system for army. This includes communications equipment for dismounted soldiers and vehicles. The scope includes new LOS and BLOS transmission equipment and the necessary switching and routing software and hardware including an access interface for current and future applications. It also requires interfaces to the deployed wide area and local area systems being provided by LAND 2072 Phase 2B and JP2030 with interfaces back to the strategic networks being provided by JP2008 and JP2047.

LAND 75 provides the principle battle management system (BMS) for the ADF land forces. It has been implemented as a vertical stove-piped integration model right from the BMS application itself through the middleware layer including switching and routing all the way down to the physical radio. The identification and opening of the key interfaces through this vertical structure will be important to allow the integration of new applications, transmission bearers and other services necessary to meet the network centric capability goals.

The vehicle programs LAND 121 Phase 3, 121 Phase 4, 400 and 500 will provide their own internal systems but will need to identify and open interfaces to support hosting of the hardware and/or software equipment being provided by LAND 2072 Phase 3 and LAND 75.

JP2008, 2047 and LAND 2072 Phase 2B respectively provide the satellite terrestrial infrastructure, the fixed terrestrial communications network and the deployed battlefield telecommunication network. These particular programs have reasonably well defined boundaries with open interfaces operating at the lower layers of the communications service protocols. Therefore they do support interoperability and are capable of integrating future services. One example illustrating openness is the Tactical Interface (TACINT) concept that connects the fixed networks through the satellite system to the deployed networks.

The above is a subset of issues, there are many more key interfaces across the various systems that are required to deliver the overall integrated capability. Each interface needs to be identified, understood, defined and assessed to determine its impact on current and future integration efforts. Those with high impact should be designated as requiring to be “open” with clearly defined and open standards. Section III will discuss more details about how other international defence agencies are using an OSA to address these issues.

Problems Can Arise

Without clear direction and requirements regarding an OSA, vendors will not necessarily implement these standards but rather provide least effort solutions and will deliver only to the contract requirements. This could hide key interfaces from the ADF that should remain open making cross-program integration efforts very challenging and expensive to achieve. Vendors may be inclined to make claims regarding the “openness” of their solutions, however if integration cannot be performed unencumbered by third parties, the claim is false and the vendor has achieved a locked-in position they can exploit.

An Opens Systems Approach Proposal

This section proposes a high level model based on the NATO C3 technical services framework. A generalized structure such as this could be used as a reference model when developing program requirements and provide a systematic means to identify and allocate all the services and equipment needed to meet the functional and performance requirements of the capability needed. This could assist in determining key interfaces and boundaries by using the structured layers and so be a useful tool to break the stove-pipe stranglehold on capability.

The Platform Concept

A platform concept is a general term for a system or device to which third parties can add applications or services to deliver a specific capability. One good example is the Android phone. Some defence agencies have even considered the development of the app store concept where Defence users and developers could implement new apps for example to address new capability areas or better manage emerging threats. The concept is that these apps are fully implemented by third parties completely independently of the original platform manufacturer.

Using an OSA, Defence could manage its procurement programs to deliver open platforms for soldier and vehicle systems that could keep up with new capability demands and be more future-proof.

A Model for Defence Programs

Reference [2] advises “The MOSA is not a panacea, and programs shouldn’t blindly follow the concept. Programs should make a business case for implementing open systems solutions after carefully analysing capabilities and strategies contained in capability development documents and their acquisition strategy to ensure they lend themselves to the development of an open architecture.”

There are arguments against open systems in cases where the vertical integration is able to be completed by a single vendor cost effectively and ensures a successful end-to-end integrated capability. This needs to be considered carefully to balance the needs to delivering a capability to efficiently meet a near term need in the case where the system is relatively isolated from other associated programs and on-going interoperability with joint, allied and coalition forces is limited.

However, even in such cases an OSA may identify certain key interfaces that should be acquired as open that allows a level of future horizontal integration supporting interoperability and future capability extensions.

An initial high level reference model supporting OSA is proposed in Figure 3. It is based on the NATO C3 Technical Services Taxonomy specifically around CIS capabilities. A sub-set sample of typical equipment and capability mapping is shown for illustrative purposes. A real case of mapping is likely to have many more elements. The model allows equipment items to be identified as either User Equipment, Information Systems Equipment or Communications Equipment. It allows the associated software to be organised and managed in structured layers alongside the relevant equipment layers.

A high level OSA reference model for CIS programs.
Figure 3. A high level OSA reference model for CIS programs.

The comprehensive definition of terms provided by the NATO Taxonomy can be used as a reference to place capability functionality within the appropriate layer. For simplicity, much of the detail is not shown in Figure 3. Some functionality may cross a number of layers and not all the service definitions would be necessary for a specific functionality. Reference [9] illustrates that some functionality will have elements at most layers, for example information assurance (IA) and service monitoring and control (SMC).

Benefits the Model Could Realise

During the early program or project definition phases a suite of Capability Options Documentation (COD) is generally produced including:

  • an Operational Concept Document (OCD) that expresses the need in warfighter terms,
  • a Functional and Performance Specification (FPS) that expresses the need in engineering terms that can be procured, and
  • a Test Concept Document that identifies the means by which the capability would go through a test and evaluation program to achieve acceptance into service.

The OSA reference model would provide a framework upon which the desired equipment, services and overall functionality of a program or suite of associated programs as detailed in the COD can be systematically mapped. Further analysis may identify missing layer functionality that needs to be included and also it will assist in the identification of key interfaces that should be defined as open. With such an approach, the benefits of OSA that are listed earlier could be better realised.

CONCLUSION

This paper discussed the general concept of an OSA within the context of ADF CIS related programs. It has provided an overview of the current state of the art with the examples of what international Defence agencies are doing to achieve their capability goals. The paper discussed a set of specific ADF programs and potential issues and we propose that an OSA model adopted early as part of project definition would provide beneficial outcomes for the ADF to maximise its return on investment. There is no doubt that the body of evidence is clearly in favour of an OSA to capability enhancement resulting in stove-piping in the ADF being consigned to its rightful place as an historical footnote.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The authors acknowledge the positive efforts of the DSTO team with their useful report [1] advocating an open systems approach for ADF procurement. That work provided a foundation for this paper. This has been extended further by referencing specific ADF programs and issues, commenting on more recent international OSA efforts and proposing a platform concept reference model.

References

B. Simms, Approaches to Open Technology Systems Specification, Defence Science and Technology Organisation, DSTO-TN-1087, 2012.

C. Azani and K. Flowers, Integrating Business and Engineering Strategy Through Modular Open Systems Approach, Defense AT&L, 2005.

P. Henderson, Modular Open Systems Architecture, http://openpdq.com/OpenSystems, 2009.

UK MOD Def Stan 23-09, 2011.

M. Clark and A. Jarkey, “Vehicle Electronic Architecture Supporting Digitisation of the Modern Battle Field,” Future Land Force Conference, 2014.

European Defence Agency, LAVOSAR - Land Vehicle with Open System Architecture, 12.R&T.OP.336, 2014.

NATO STANAG 4754, Generic Systems Architecture for Land Vehicles (NGVA), 2015.

US DoD Open Systems Architecture - Contract Guidebook for Program Managers, 2013.

NATO C3 Technical Services Taxonomy Perspective, 2014.

Author

Arthur Ollett is a Technical Expert in Communications Systems at Thales. He has over 25 years of experience in electronic systems development and integration and specialises in communication system solution architectures.

John Coleman is a retired NZ Army officer. He has over 25 years of experience in the development of and procurement of capability for the NZDF and specialises in the integration of capability into operational mode.